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INTRODUCTION
It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted
in phrases and thereafter.. cease to provoke further analysis.'
The term "adequate state remedy," which often represents the
critical factor in determining where federal claims will be heard, has
become a buzzword. Although 42 U.S.C. section 1983 gives plain-
tiffs invoking federally based rights a choice of forum,2 judicial doc-
trines3 may nevertheless reroute such plaintiffs to state tribunals on
the assumption that their claims will be determined on the merits.
There has been little focus on the casual manner in which the
Supreme Court arrived at and justified this assumption, despite the
body of literature on abstention-related jurisprudence.4
1. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Parts II and III.
4. Scholars have questioned the authority of the federal judiciary to decline juris-
diction accorded by statute, see Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
Judicial Function, 94 YALE LJ. 71 (1984); have criticized the policies underlying absten-
tion, see, e.g., Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 740, 875 (1974); Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1125-27 (1977);
Soifer & Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141
(1977); have defended these policies, see, e.g., Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitu-
tional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 626-27 (1981); Shapiro, Jurisdiction and
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 580-85 (1985); and have discussed the appropriateness
of extending restrictions on federal court discretion to grant equitable relief against
pending state prosecutions to instances where the state proceeding is civil, see, e.g., Bar-
tels, Avoiding a Comity of Errors: A Modelfor Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits that "Inter-
fere" with State Civil Proceedings, 29 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1976); Aldisert, On Being Civil to
ADEQUATE STATE FORUM
Defective standards for evaluating state forum adequacy have
appeared in two principal areas. The first, epitomized by cases such
as Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. ,' involves suits seeking injunctions or
declaratory judgments against pending state proceedings.' Pennzoil
affirmed that the federal judiciary should not intervene in such cases
unless state procedures "plainly bar" consideration of the federal
issues.7
The problem with this test is its failure to address the jurisdic-
tional consequences of ambiguous state law. Suppose, for example,
that Blue is a defendant in a state tort suit, and that his real estate
business has been seized in a prejudgment attachment. Realizing
that his livelihood will be lost before trial on the underlying tort, he
commences a section 1983 suit in federal court challenging the at-
tachment on fourteenth amendment grounds. He alleges that the
state trial judge has refused to permit an interlocutory appeal of the
attachment, and that discretionary appellate review of his claims is
an uncertain and speculative remedy. Even if Blue's constitutional
claims would probably not be heard in the state courts, Pennzoil ap-
pears to require dismissal of the section 1983 suit' because relief is
not "plainly barred" in state tribunals.
The standards for evaluating a state forum have also been prob-
lematic in the area of constitutional torts. In a series of cases com-
mencing with Parratt v. Taylor,9 the Supreme Court has held that
plaintiffs alleging procedural due process violations flowing from
the random and unauthorized acts of state officials may not maintain
section 1983 suits for damages in federal court if state remedies for
the violations are adequate.'" The failure to provide standards for
determining adequacy, however, has caused confusion and conflict
Younger, 11 CONN. L. REV. 181 (1979); Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches a Civil Matur-
ity: Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 997 (1989); Vairo, Making
Younger Civil: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Court Proceedings: A Re-
sponse to Professor Stravitz, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 173 (1989).
5. 481 U.S. 1 (1987). See infra Part II.
6. Obstacles to obtaining a merits determination of federal claims in a state court
are generally greater where the pending action is civil rather than criminal. See infra
section II(B)(2); Vairo, supra note 4, at 194-97. However, criminal courts cannot pro-
vide class or prospective relief. See, e.g., Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions:
The Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 193, 194 (1978).
7. See infra notes 78-109 and accompanying text analyzing Pennzoil and its pre-
decessors.
8. See infra section II(B)(I). But see also infra note 129 discussing a pre-Pennzoil cir-
cuit court response to such a suit.
9. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).




in the lower courts. 1 '
Presume that Gray has been involuntarily committed to a state
mental hospital. He has assembled affidavits as a basis for challeng-
ing this commitment, but a hospital employee intentionally bums
these materials. Gray files a section 1983 suit in the federal district
court, requesting damages for the deprivation of his property and
alleging that the nominal compensation available in the state forum
would not enable him to reconstruct ruined affidavits from persons
now residing overseas. The district judge dismisses the case, noting
that under applicable Supreme Court rulings, state common-law
remedies are adequate even when they do not accord the "full"
amount that would be available under section 1983.12
The Parratt standard presents two difficulties. Failure to define
adequacy has resulted, as in the Pennzoil area, in dismissal of cases
which would probably not be heard on the merits by state tribu-
nals."3 Furthermore, plaintiffs like Gray may be accorded a state
hearing but are not granted adequate recompense for intentional
deprivations caused by state employees.
In developing its preference for state adjudication of federal is-
sues under Pennzoil and Parratt, the Supreme Court articulated its
policy justifications at some length. Federalism, which encompasses
state autonomy and the harmonious coexistence of dual judicial sys-
tems, counsels against disruption or denigration of state processes.
District judges would be engaging in unpalatable as well as ineffi-
cient expenditures of federal energy if they were to replicate state
functions.' 4 Yet these explanations of power allocation have ne-
glected justifying the high Court's adequacy tests in situations
where state courts do not fill the vacuum.
This Article argues that the federal judiciary should upgrade its
present scrutiny of state forum adequacy in conformity with consti-
tutional and congressional directives. Fortunately, a standard for
such heightened scrutiny already exists in the Supreme Court's own
jurisprudence.
This standard has been used in the adequate-state-grounds
context when the Supreme Court must decide whether to grant cer-
11. See infra subpart III(C).
12. See infra note 208 and accompanying text, discussing conflicting judicial rulings
in cases involving intentional destruction of legal papers.
13. See infra notes 254-66 and accompanying text. The federal interest in redressing
such deprivations is discussed infra subpart III(B).
14. These rationales and related policy justifications are discussed in full infra Part
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tiorari review of a state court decision that petitioner alleges has un-
fairly submerged federal claims.' 5 The state's position is that it did
not consider these claims on the merits because petitioner had vio-
lated a valid procedural rule that was a prerequisite to such consid-
eration. Petitioner argues that this rule has not been consistently
applied to other similarly situated state litigants and may therefore
be discounted. The state responds that there has been no inconsis-
tency, and that its decision must be upheld because it is based on
adequate state grounds.
Resolution of such adequate-state-grounds cases turns on ex-
amination of ambiguous state law. In this context, the Supreme
Court has conscientiously dissected the pattern and meaning of
prior state precedent to make an adequacy determination. This
methodology is far more appropriate for evaluating state forum ade-
quacy than use of the Pennzoil and Parratt approaches.
Further analysis of the heightened scrutiny model is presented
in Part I of this Article. Parts II and III discuss the Pennzoil and Par-
ratt areas, respectively, and identify issues that the Supreme Court
has failed to treat. Part IV compares the rationales proffered in the
major cases previously discussed, and concludes that the present in-
consistency in adequacy tests is unwarranted. In Part V, judicial and
legislative solutions are proposed, accompanied by detailed
examples.
I. THE HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY MODEL: ADEQUATE STATE
GROUNDS
The paradigm of an inadequate forum is presented by a state's
unwarranted refusal to hear a party's federal claims. Such a case
might never be identified if the Supreme Court's methodology were
simply to accept the state's own characterization of its processes.
Posit a situation in which a state litigant who violated a procedural
rule is thereafter barred from presenting federal issues to the state
judiciary. The claimant seeks Supreme Court review, arguing that
the procedural barrier invoked in the decision below has not been
consistently applied in comparable litigation.
The state responds that its tribunals have expertly and fairly in-
terpreted their own precedents and, therefore, the adequate-state-
grounds doctrine precludes reversal. This doctrine applies when a
decision of a state court rests on a nonfederal basis that supports the
15. See infra Part I.
1991]
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judgment. 6 Where appropriate support exists, the Supreme Court
follows a policy of restraining itself from reviewing the state deter-
mination even if federal issues have been raised.' 7
The critical question is whether the state grounds are reason-
able and in accord with previous state authority.' If this test is not
16. Initially, Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875), held that
the mere presence of a federal issue in a case would not justify federal review of a state
court decision that was appropriately supported by adequate and independent
nonfederal grounds. Id. at 632-33. Ninety years later, the Court distinguished state
substantive grounds, such as those in Murdock, from state procedural grounds. See
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 446-49 (1965). While review of the federal question
in Murdock would have no effect on the outcome, as the decision was independently
supported by state law, a state procedural rule could conceivably be invoked to bar con-
sideration of the federal issue. Thus, the validity of such a rule is in and of itself a
federal question. The procedure must serve "a legitimate state interest." Id. at 447.
The independence of the state ground is also examined. See Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1979) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a federal issue
where the state court did not declare that its decision rested on an independent state
ground). The state ground must be broad enough to maintain the judgment. See Eustis
v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 369-70 (1893) (state ground that is sufficiently broad to support
a judgment without reference to the federal question precludes Supreme Court review).
17. This policy of abstention is less a product of explicit congressional or constitu-
tional restriction than a practice evolving out of the Supreme Court's interpretation of
its own jurisdiction. See Matasar & Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional
Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 1291, 1322-25 (1986). The Supreme Court has chosen to interpret its jurisdic-
tional statute so as to refrain from passing on questions of state law, if doing so would
result either in duplication or in unwarranted intrusion into predominantly local affairs.
18. See Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground. Proposals for a
Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 187, 226-27 (1965). The proffered state basis must
also be supported by the record. Id. See also Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253
U.S. 17, 22-24 (1920), discussed infra note 296.
The Supreme Court has not unequivocally endorsed the view that states should be
hobbled by their own prior rules of procedure. The decision in Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust
& Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930), disclaimed any intention of precluding retroac-
tive changes in such rules. Justice Brandeis said that "the mere fact that a state court has
... overruled principles or doctrines established by previous decisions on which a party
relied, does not give rise to a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment or otherwise
confer appellate jurisdiction on this Court." Id. at 680. Nonetheless, petitioner was
rescued by a constitutional due process analysis. The Missouri Supreme Court had re-
fused to consider an equal protection tax claim on the grounds that plaintiff had no right
to equitable relief because an adequate remedy at law-recourse to the State Tax Com-
mission-had been ignored. Id. at 675-76. The United States Supreme 'Court reversed,
finding that a denial of due process had occurred because the remedy before the State
Tax Commission was nonexistent until the Supreme Court of Missouri created it in the
case at bar, at a time when it was too late to invoke such a remedy. Id. at 677. Justice
Brandeis concluded: "Whether acting through its judiciary or through its legislature, a
State may not deprive a person of all existing remedies for the enforcement of a right,
which the State has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded to him some
real opportunity to protect it." Id. at 682. Later Supreme Court analysis has empha-
sized the importance of precedent as a measure of the federally mandated goal of consis-
tency. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958)
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met, the Supreme Court may proceed to consider the federal
claims.' 9 The testing process as to ambiguous precedents, which
involves a penetrating examination of state orders and rules, should
serve as a model for adequacy determinations in other contexts.
Projecting respect for state institutions while striving to protect
federal rights is a delicate operation. Consider the problem of as-
sessing a discretionary decision by a state appeals court to review a
federal issue that was not raised below-a later refusal to exercise
such discretion in other similar instances could be characterized as
invidious. Even if appellate forgiveness of default is accompanied
by a full explanation,20 the state court's subsequent unwillingness to
overlook procedural errors of the same kind may become questiona-
ble. Because prior lenience might suggest that the cost of leniency
is not daunting, why not follow suit where federal rights are at
stake?
This demanding approach is illustrated in Sullivan v. Little Hunt-
ing Park, Inc.21 The majority took the position that because the state
had declined to use its previously exercised power to review a prof-
(novelty in state procedural requirements will not bar review of federal constitutional
rights where petitioner has justifiably relied upon prior decisions); see also infra notes 40-
45 and accompanying text.
19. The statute providing for the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review decisions of
state courts is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1988), amended by Act ofJune 27, 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-352, § 3, 102 Stat. 662 (1988). Review by writ of certiorari may be accorded
where:
a) the validity of any federal statute or treaty is put in question by the deci-
sion;
b) the validity of a state statute is put in question as being repugnant to the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States; or
c) the decision violates a right, privilege or immunity created by or claimed
under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States.
Id.
The finality requirement of § 1257 limits the Supreme Court to review of a state
court judgment when such a judgment "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing for the court to do but execute thejudgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S.
229, 233 (1945).
20. Unexplained ad hoc deviations from state rules could be more easily seized upon
as evidence of inconsistency. See Sandalow, supra note 18, at 226 (concluding neverthe-
less that ad hoc discretion cases would not generally reach the United States Supreme
Court).
21. 396 U.S. 229 (1969). Little Hunting Park was a Virginia nonstock corporation
that provided a playground and community park for residents of Fairfax County. A
membership share in the corporation entitled the holder to use these facilities and to
assign the share to tenants, subject to approval by the board of directors. Id. at 234.
Although the facilities had been open to any white person in the geographic area, a
homeowner's assignment of a share to a black tenant was refused on racial grounds.
The white owner of the house, who was expelled from the corporation for protesting
this refusal, joined the black tenant in bringing suit for injunctive relief and damages.
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fered federal claim, there was no adequate state ground supporting
the judgment below.22 The case challenged a refusal to allow a
black family to use certain community facilities, and arose under 42
U.S.C. section 1982's guarantee that all citizens have the same right
as a white person to lease, hold, or convey property. 5
The Supreme Court of Virginia had denied the claimants' ap-
peals because they were not perfected in accordance with a rule gov-
erning records on appeal. 4 "[Olpposing counsel was not given
reasonable notice of the time and place of tendering the transcript
and a reasonable opportunity to examine the original or a true copy
of it."2 The Virginia court twice found26 that it had no jurisdiction
to reach the substantive issue because of this procedural error.
The United States Supreme Court's ruling, contained in a few
spare paragraphs, cited prior state decisions and concluded that
although the "reasonable notice" barrier was not novel, its applica-
tion had been discretionary rather than jurisdictional. That is, the
court below had not been bound by its own law, but had simply
decided to restrain itself.27 In a convoluted sentence, the majority
Id. at 235. The trial court concluded that Little Hunting Park was a private social club
and dismissed the complaints. Id. at 236.
22. Id. at 233-34.
23. Id. at 234.
24. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals relied on former VA. SuP. CT. APP. R.
5:1, § 3(f) (1957), which required that the transcript be tendered to the trial judge within
60 days, and signed by him within 70 days of the final judgment. The rule further re-
quired that written notice of the time and place of the tendering be given to opposing
counsel along with an opportunity to examine the transcript. 396 U.S. at 231 & n.l.
25. 396 U.S. at 231. Counsel for petitioner in Sullivan had sent transcripts to the
judge on the 9th of the month, filing at the same time motions to correct, and requesting
that the judge delay acting on the motions for 10 days in order to allow opposing coun-
sel time to respond. The judge was absent from his chambers and did not receive the
transcript until the 12th. The motions were heard on the 16th; thus there were 3 days
remaining out of the original 10 in which counsel for respondent had the opportunity to
examine the record. No objections were raised as to the corrections or the entry of
orders granting the motions to correct, nor did respondent complain at the time of be-
ing deprived of a reasonable opportunity to examine the transcript. Id. at 232-33.
Nonetheless, the appellate court ruled that this procedural error deprived the court of
jurisdiction to hear petitioner's appeal. Id. at 231.
26. On the first occasion that Sullivan went to the Supreme Court on a petition for
certiorari, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further consideration in
light ofJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 392 U.S. 657 (1968) (per curiam). On remand, however, the Virginia appellate
court maintained that it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Sullivan v. Little Hunt-
ing Park, Inc., 209 Va. 279, 281, 163 S.E.2d 588, 589 (1968). Thus, the issue was now
before the Supreme Court for the second time, after the state court had in effect simply
re-issued its prior decision. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 231
(1969).
27. 396 U.S. at 234.
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found that earlier state cases "do not enable us to say that the Vir-
ginia court has so consistently applied its notice requirement as to
amount to a self-denial of the power to entertain the federal claim
here presented "28 Thus, review by state certiorari was not
precluded.
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion agreed that Virginia had not
demonstrated a valid basis for barring certiorari, but his conception
of discretion differed from the majority's. 9 He concluded that a
state court may validly exercise discretion pursuant to a general
standard (such as reasonableness) which requires "a close analysis
of the facts of a particular case in light of competing policy consider-
ations."3 Discretionary review could legitimately be granted in
some instances and denied in others. In Sullivan, however, the de-
nial was not legitimate because the circumstances too closely resem-
bled earlier cases where leniency had been shown.3 Petitioners
28. Id. at 233-34 (emphasis in original). The Court went on to hold that Sullivan's
membership share in Little Hunting Park was an integral part of the tenant's lease. Id. at
237. Thus, a racially discriminatory refusal of Sullivan's assignment constituted a viola-
tion of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1962). 396 U.S. at 237.
29. See id. at 243 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 245 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31. In his dissent in Sullivan, Justice Harlan noted that the Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals had applied a "standard of reasonableness much stricter than that which
could have fairly been extracted from the earlier Virginia cases applying [VA. SuP. CT. R.
5:1, § 3(f) (1957)] .... " Id. at 245 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan concluded
that the petitioners justifiably might have thought that their appeal would not be barred
from review by the Supreme Court of Appeals based on the principle outlined in Baci-
galupo v. Fleming, 199 Va. 827, 102 S.E.2d 321 (1958), and previous cases involving
rule 5:1, § 3(f). 396 U.S. at 245-46 & nn.10 & 12 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In Bacigalupo, the Supreme Court of Appeals interpreted the rule as requiring that
opposing counsel be given a reasonable opportunity to examine the transcript after re-
ceiving notice and to object to the accuracy of the record before the judge signs it. 199
Va. at 835, 102 S.E.2d at 326. The trial judge is to make a reasonableness determination
based on the particular facts of the case.
Relying on the Bacigalupo principle, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found
two days to be sufficient opportunity to examine the transcript. Cook v. Virginia Hol-
sum Bakeries, Inc., 207 Va. 815, 816-17, 153 S.E.2d 209, 210 (1967); see also Bolin v.
Laderberg, 207 Va. 795, 153 S.E.2d 251 (1967) (affirming the lower court's determina-
tion that a two-day opportunity to examine and object to the transcript was adequate).
On the other hand, in Snead v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 850, 108 S.E.2d 399, cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 868 (1959), the court found that a time period of 30 minutes did not
satisfy the requirements of Rule 5:1, § 3(f). Justice Harlan distinguished Sullivan from
Snead, noting the obvious difference in the opportunity for examination and objection
before the judge signed the record. 396 U.S. at 246 n.13 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In Sullivan the opposing counsel received oral notice on June 9, and written notice
on June 12. He had the opportunity to examine the record in the judge's chambers
between June 12 and June 16, and had actual possession of the record between June 16
and June 19. Id. at 245 n. 12 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In light of the above discussion,
Justice Harlan concluded that the petitioners were reasonable in believing they had sat-
1991]
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might justifiably have assumed that the notice they gave was proper
under prior precedents. Thus, Virginia's ruling was not predicated
upon adequate state grounds.32
Subsequent decisions have stressed Justice Harlan's theme of
unfair surprise13 rather than the majority's distinction between dis-
cretion and jurisdiction. However, both opinions in Sullivan typify
in one significant respect the Court's adequate-state-grounds analy-
sis. They both scrutinized Virginia's position and all state prece-
dents in order to protect litigants who "seek vindication in state
courts of their federal ... rights."'3 4
In some instances, rejection of a procedural barrier has been
buttressed by evidence of the state's hostility to constitutional guar-
antees. NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Flowers,"5 a pre-Sullivan decision,
reviewed in great detail the Alabama Supreme Court's rule that
"where unrelated assignments of error are argued together and one
is without merit, the others will not be considered."'3 6 This rule had
been the predicate for refusing to adjudicate federal issues raised in
an NAACP brief filed in the Alabama courts.
Nine pages of the United States Supreme Court's unanimous
opinion analyzed the brief and the state's handling of other assign-
ments-of-error cases. 37 The decision concluded:
Had the petitioner simply omitted the Roman numerals
which subdivide its 'Argument' section, intended presuma-
bly as an organizational aid to understanding, there would
have been no conceivable basis for the suggestion that the
isfied Rule 5:1, § 3(f). Therefore, there was no adequate state ground for the decision of
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. Id. at 247.
32. 396 U.S. at 247 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. While a doctrinal change could be so unexpected that litigants would be de-
prived of the opportunity to comply, a novel ruling could also stem from misapplication
rather than revision of existing doctrine. See, e.g., Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal
Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1139 n.44 (1986); Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 943, 969-71 (1965).
34. Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 247 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting with approval from
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958)). The Sullivan majority
also relied on NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.
35. 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
36. Id. at 295 (quoting the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court, NAACP v. State,
274 Ala. 544, 546, 150 So. 2d 677, 679 (1963)).
37. Id. at 293-302. The Supreme Court of Alabama found at least one of the assign-
ments of error in each subdivision of the argument section of the NAACP's brief to be
without merit. On this basis, it refused to consider the merits of any other assignment.
Id. at 290. The United States Supreme Court held that Alabama had not consistently
applied its rules with this degree of rigidity. In case after case, Alabama courts had
exercised discretion to consider the merits of issues not strictly presented in the pre-
scribed form. Id. at 293 -302.
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various errors were argued 'in bulk' . . . . The considera-
tion of asserted constitutional rights may not be thwarted
by simple recitation that there has not been observance of a
procedural rule with which there has been compliance in
both substance and form, in every real sense.38
Such painstaking methodology has also been used in situations
where no games-playing by the state was identified.3 9 Procedural
barriers stem from a variety of factors. Some rules of procedure
may simply be archaic; others might be generally fair but not fine-
tuned to unusual cases. 40 Nonetheless, a neutrally generated rule
that is not uniformly applied could unjustifiably deprive litigants of
a hearing on the merits of a federal claim.
A consistency requirement facilitates certiorari review for such
litigants without stigmatizing the court below.41  In Hathorn v.
Lovorn,42 for example, Mississippi argued that petitioners' claim
under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was untimely and could not be
heard.43 The claim had never been raised until a petition was filed
in the Mississippi Supreme Court requesting a rehearing.44
38. Id. at 297 (emphasis in original). SimilarlyJames v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 349
(1984), found that the state was setting "springes" for a criminal defendant who had
"plainly and reasonably" asserted his constitutional rights (quoting from Davis v.
Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923)). At trial in a Kentucky court, defense counsel had
requested that the jury be told not to draw an adverse inference from defendant's failure
to take the stand. The trial judge refused this request; defendant was convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment. The Kentucky Supreme Court conceded that defendant
would have been entitled to an "instruction" to the jury on the issue. However, the
court ruled that defendant had merely asked for an "admonition," which could properly
be denied, and that his failure to avail himself of the right to an instruction was a proce-
dural default constituting an adequate and independent state ground. Id. at 344.
This ruling was reversed. Justice White's majority opinion for the United States
Supreme Court minutely parsed Kentucky's case law and rules, as well as the somewhat
inadequate trial record, in holding that the defendant's alleged defect in form "must be
more evident than it is here" in order to block further review. Id. at 351.
39. See Meltzer, supra note 33, at 1136.
40. Id.
41. The consistency test is useful for additional reasons. Professor Sandalow points
out that this test, where satisfied, demonstrates that the state procedure is used to bar
both federal and state claims, and is therefore nondiscriminatory in its purpose.
Sandalow, supra note 18, at 221.
42. 457 U.S. 255 (1982).
43. Id. at 262. The claim was based on § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c (1988). This section provides in relevant part that no change in voting practices
or procedures can be put into effect unless the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia has ruled that the modification does not have the purpose or effect of
limiting the right to vote based on race, or of violating other guarantees provided in the
Act. Any such proposal first must be submitted for approval to the Attorney General of
the United States.
44. Hathorn, 457 U.S. at 260-61. In 1975, voters brought an action in state court to
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The United States Supreme Court discounted Mississippi's po-
sition, ruling that "a state procedural ground is not 'adequate' un-
less the procedural rule is 'strictly or regularly followed.' "45
Indeed, Justice O'Connor's sophisticated Hathorn analysis noted the
vintage of the cases proffered by the state and pointed out that Mis-
sissippi's recent decisions often granted petitions for rehearing
without concern about whether such petitions raised new issues.46
The majority did not express any suspicion about the state's motives
in the case at bar, but instead focused on the irregularity of the
rule's implementation.
Thus, although the tone of the Supreme Court's adequate-
state-ground opinions may modulate, the message is unmistakable.
Extinguishing federal rights without a hearing is disfavored, and a
state's assertion that its procedures are fairly applied does not pre-
clude further exacting inquiry.
II. NEGLIGIBLE SCRUTINY: A PENDING STATE PROCEEDING AS AN
ADEQUATE FORUM
The Supreme Court has explicitly discouraged evaluation of the
state forum by district courts asked to enjoin pending state proceed-
enforce a 1964 state statute, which had never been implemented, changing the mode of
election of members of the Louisville District School Board. Id. at 258. The lower court
dismissed the action, finding that the law violated the state constitutional bar to local
legislation. Id. at 258-59. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed, and also denied
defendant local officials' petition for rehearing in which they argued for the first time
that the statute could not be implemented until the change was pre-approved under § 5
of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 259.
.On remand, the trial court ordered an election pursuant to the statute but required
the election plan to be submitted to the Attorney General for clearance. The Attorney
General rejected the plan, and the trial court thereafter held the election in abeyance.
Id. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that its prior decision was the law of
the case and that the trial court should not have conditioned the election on compliance
with the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 260-61.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and rejected Mississippi's
contention that reliance on the Voting Rights Act issue in the earlier petition for rehear-
ing had been untimely. Recent Mississippi Supreme Court decisions had "regularly"
considered issues raised for the first time in petitions for rehearing. Id. at 263. Thus,
there was no adequate state ground which precluded review. Finally, the Supreme
Court decided that no change in electoral procedures could be implemented until the
requirements of § 5 had been met. Id. at 270-71.
45. Id. at 262-63 (quoting with approval from Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S.
146, 149 (1964)). In Barr, the Supreme Court of South Carolina had refused to pass on
objections to breach of the peace convictions arising out of a peaceful sit-in demonstra-
tion because the exceptions taken below were "too general" to be considered. The
United States Supreme Court reversed, pointing out that identical exceptions had been
considered in other cases during the same time period. 378 U.S. at 149.
46. 457 U.S. at 263.
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ings.4 7 In our prior hypothetical, Blue is litigating in both state and
federal tribunals. He has commenced an action under section 1983,
alleging that the pending state case will jeopardize his constitutional
rights unless federal judicial aid is forthcoming. The district court
judge rules that Blue's claim should be pursued in the state courts-
a ruling implicitly predicated on the feasibility of this pursuit.
Logic would seem to dictate that if there were an ambiguity in
state law, for example uncertainty as to whether the claim could be
asserted as a defense or presented on appeal, federal intervention
would be considerably more likely. However, the standards gov-
erning such intervention bear no kinship to the model used in
parsing adequate-state-grounds claims.48
The Supreme Court affirmed in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. ,49 that
district courts should presume that state remedies are adequate un-
less state procedures "plainly bar" presentation of the federal is-
sue.5" This casual approach is particularly problematic because the
federal judiciary is instructed to dismiss arguably meritorious consti-
tutional claims without regard for the fate of such claims in state
tribunals.
Evaluation of Pennzoil's rationale requires several steps: first,
an overview of the nonintervention and abstention doctrines; sec-
ond, an exploration of the tenuous position assigned to the ade-
quate forum issue in nonintervention cases; and, finally, an analysis
of a post-Pennzoil methodology for handling state provisions that are
ambiguous or unreceptive to federal questions.
A. Nonintervention and Abstention: An Overview
Federalism concerns are neither new, nor solely a judicial in-
vention. The Anti-Injunction Law5" embodies a congressional ban
against any federal court injunction to halt proceedings pending in a
state court unless the case falls within one of the authorized excep-
tions listed in the act.5 2 However, this statute itself could be re-
47. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
481 U.S. 1, 2 (1987).
48. See infra Part IV for full discussion of the similarities and differences between
these two contexts.
49. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
50. Id. at 14-15.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988).
52. The law provides: "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to
stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." Id.
This enactment dates back to a 1793 prohibition against the granting of writs of injunc-
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garded as an exception to the policy expressed in 28 U.S.C. section
1343(3), which provides for district court jurisdiction "to redress"
any deprivation of equal rights effectuated under color of state law.
Concomitantly, section 1983 directs the district courts to entertain
and determine constitutional and federal statutory issues.
1. The Younger Decision: Nonintervention Because of a Pending.
State Proceeding.--Congress has been far from unequivocal in its def-
erence to the competence and impartiality of state courts. The Civil
Rights Act,53 a prime example of congressional skepticism, was
promulgated to "interpose the federal courts between the States
and the people."'4 However, Younger v. Harris55 and its descendants
instruct district courts to step aside when section 1983 plaintiffs are
involved in pending state proceedings.
Harris was charged under a state criminal syndicalism statute,
and challenged his indictment in federal court on the grounds that it
chilled the exercise of his first amendment rights to discuss and
teach unpopular views." Justice Black's majority decision bypassed
tion by federal judges to stay state court proceedings. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5,
1 Stat. 334-35. The exceptions were passed in 1948. See Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 646,
§ 2283, 62 Stat. 869, 968.
Congress has also deferred to the states in regulating the timing of federal habeas
corpus relief, which cannot be granted unless the petitioner has first exhausted available
state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988). The exhaustion requirement was
absent in the 1867 statute granting federal habeas corpus to state prisoners. However,
Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1886), found that requirement to be implicit. The
exhaustion rule was not codified until 1948. Law ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2254, 62
Stat. 869, 967.
Another example of congressional deference is 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988), re-
stricting removal of federal question cases from state tribunals to those that could have
been filed in federal court in the first place.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
54. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (Congress "expressly authorized"
federal courts to issue injunctions against state proceedings where state action, includ-
ing that of state courts, was being used to harass or injure individuals). See also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1988) (giving federal district courts federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3)(1988) (giving the district courts jurisdiction over civil rights and constitu-
tional claims).
55. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
56. Id. at 38-41. Harris sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, charging that the California
Criminal Syndicalism Act, under which he was indicted and being prosecuted, violated
his first amendment rights to free speech and press. Id. at 39. The statute, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 11400 (West 1982), outlawed teaching or advocating the necessity for commit-
ting crimes, sabotage, terrorism, or unlawful acts of violence as a means of accomplish-
ing political change or change in industrial ownership or control. 401 U.S. at 38 n. 1.
The dissent concluded that Harris was prosecuted for "distributing leaflets advocating




the issue of whether the anti-injunction statute deprived the Court
of the power to enjoin the pending state proceeding. Instead, the
majority held that equity, comity, and "Our Federalism"-policies
predating the statutory barrier-substantially restrict the discretion
of federal district courts to intervene, even when a state prosecution
proceeds under an unconstitutional statute.5 7
Younger was brought under section 1983. In a subsequent deci-
sion, Mitchum v. Foster,"8 the Supreme Court stated the obvious by
holding that a subliminal premise in Younger was that section 1983 is
one of the statutory exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Law and
therefore no congressional obstacle prevented the granting of re-
lief.5 '9 Nonetheless, Younger had already narrowly circumscribed fed-
eral district court discretion to accord such relief.6 ° This prudential
burden is a special feature of the Court's section 1983 jurispru-
57. Id. at 43-44. "Our Federalism" refers to "a system in which there is sensitivity to
the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the Na-
tional Government [protects federal rights and interests] in ways that will not unduly
interfere with the legitimate activities of the States." Id. at 44.
These policies will be considered in full, infra Part IV. At this juncture it is impor-
tant to note the severity of the intervention restrictions imposed by the majority. The
federal plaintiff must demonstrate bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary
circumstance justifying equitable relief. Id. at 54. An illustration of such an exceptional
circumstance was given: a statute "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitu-
tional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph .... " Id. at 53-54 (quoting
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)). The Court also required a showing of
"great and immediate" danger of irreparable injury, without explaining the extent to
which such injury differs from the traditional equitable standard of irreparable harm. Id.
at 46. See Collins, The Right to Avoid Trial: Justifying Federal Court Intervention into Ongoing
State Court Proceedings, 66 N.C.L. REv. 49, 57 (1987). Neither formulation would recog-
nize the pain and expense of enduring a good faith legal proceeding as sufficient in itself
to warrant an injunction. 401 U.S. at 54. Under any interpretation of the operative
phraseology and multiple requirements for success, the federal plaintiff's burden is ex-
tremely high.
58. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
59. Id. at 231. It was noted that the Younger majority would not have reached the
difficult issue of discretion if it could have disposed of the litigation by citing a flat con-
gressional ban on equitable redress. Id.
Mitchum squarely held that § 1983 was an "authorized exception" to the Anti-In-
junction Law, because the purpose of § 1983 was to place the federal courts between the
states and the people as guarantors of constitutional rights. Id. at 242. "In carrying out
that purpose, Congress plainly authorized the federal courts to issue injunctions in
§ 1983 actions, by expressly authorizing a 'suit in equity' as one of the means of re-
dress." Id. Federal injunctive relief can sometimes be required to prevent "great, im-
mediate, and irreparable loss of a person's constitutional rights." Id.
60. Another ironic point of contrast between the two cases was that the first decision,
Younger, assumed that state courts are competent to carry out their responsibility to en-
force the United States Constitution. 401 U.S. at 56-57 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Mitchum rejected this assumption, and stressed the important role of federal district
courts as ombudsmen. 407 U.S. at 242.
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dence.6 ' Other authorized exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Law,
such as tax statutes,62 have not been diminished by Supreme Court
restrictions on judicial freedom to redress federal claims.
The reach of the nonintervention doctrine has been increasing.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Younger indicated that be-
cause the majority only addressed the limitations on interfering with
state criminal prosecutions, future cases might affirm a broader free-
dom to intervene in state civil proceedings. 63  However, later
Supreme Court holdings established that where a state has a vital
interest in a pending civil proceeding, the Younger rule would apply.
Many circumstances have been found to evidence such an interest:
state actions that were quasi-criminal; 4 were initiated by the state
itself to implement fiscal programs; 65 involved the powers of the
61. While Younger involved a request for an injunction against pending state pro-
ceedings, its conclusions were also applied to declaratory relief in the companion case of
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). The author of this Article argued the Samuels
case in the Supreme Court on behalf of New York State. The argument occurred eight
years before Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 426 (1979), presented the "clearly bars"
standard, which reduced the possibility that the § 1983 plaintiff seeking intervention will
be heard in any forum. See infra note 109 and section II(B)(I).
Justice Black, who had set out the majority view in Younger, also wrote the Samuels
opinion. The federal plaintiff had been indicted under a state sedition statute that for-
bade advocating the overthrow of the state government by force. The law had been
narrowly interpreted by New York's highest court as applicable only when the person
charged intended to incite immediate action and when there was a clear and present
danger that such action would occur. 401 U.S. at 68. Defendants were charged with
planning to fire-bomb the subways and assassinate certain state officials. They had
amassed a storehouse of weapons, including grenades and guns, which were discovered
after a valid search. Samuels v. Mackell, 288 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 401 U.S. at
74-75 (Douglas J., concurring). Defendants requested a declaratory judgment that the
state law violated constitutional rights to freedom of speech and association. The
Supreme Court held that such a declaration would be as disruptive as an injunction. 401
U.S. at 73. If it were not to be treated as a mere piece of paper, the federal judgment
would be respected by state officials and would, therefore, halt the prosecution. Id. at
69. Thus, plaintiffs were required to make the same showing as a litigant seeking injunc-
tive relief.
62. See infra section II(B)(2).
63. 401 U.S. at 55 (Stewart, J., concurring).
64. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), where the operator of a theater
showing obscene motion pictures brought a § 1983 suit in federal court, challenging a
state court judgment that shut down the theater for a year under a nuisance statute. The
district court enjoined the execution of a portion of the state judgment which closed the
theater to films that had not been adjudged obscene. The Supreme Court held that
Younger abstention applied to a civil proceeding which was similar to a criminal prosecu-
tion, id. at 604, and that the plaintiff must litigate in state court or show that one of the
exceptions to the Younger doctrine applied in order to litigate in federal court. Id. at 609.
65. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977), discussed in detail infa section
II(B)(2).
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state courts;6 or addressed important concerns such as disciplining
attorneys.6 7 Disruption of state administrative proceedings was sim-
ilarly restricted. 68
66. SeeJuidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), where appellees were held in contempt
after they failed to satisfy judgments against them, and were fined and imprisoned for
failure to obey subpoenas. In response to their challenge under § 1983, the district
court enjoined the enforcement of the contempt procedures. The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that comity and federalism require federal abstention where a state's
contempt process is involved; interference was an affront to the state's legitimate activi-
ties and a negative reflection on the state court's ability to enforce the Constitution. Id.
at 335-36. Because appellees had an opportunity to present their constitutional claims
and no exceptions in the Younger doctrine applied, the district court should have ab-
stained from enjoining the state's contempt procedures. Id. at 337.
67. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423
(1982), where such discipline was found to be a significant state interest. Middlesex is
discussed in detail infra note 109.
68. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court held that Younger would require abstention in
deference to state administrative proceedings involving important state interests if these
proceedings gave federal plaintiffs a "full and fair opportunity" to present their consti-
tutional claims. Id. at 627. Even if there is doubt that the administrative tribunal could
itself dispose of constitutional issues, it is sufficient that such issues could be vindicated
as part of the state's judicial review.
In Dayton, a pregnant teacher was told that her contract to teach in a private school
would not be renewed because of the school's policy that mothers should remain at
home with preschool-aged children. When she threatened to sue the school under state
and federal nondiscrimination legislation, she was terminated for violating an "internal
resolution" clause in her contract. Id. at 623. Based on the teacher's complaint, the
Ohio Civil Rights Commission initiated administrative proceedings against the school,
which defended on the basis of first amendment religious guarantees. The school then
commenced suit in the federal district court, seeking to enjoin the pending administra-
tive proceedings. Id. at 624. The district court denied the request for injunctive relief,
ruling that the Commission's proposed action would not violate the first and fourteenth
amendments. The United States Supreme Court held that under Younger, the district
court should have abstained because plaintiff could raise the constitutional issues in the
state courts. Id. at 625.
In a footnote the Court addressed situations where administrative proceedings are
too informal to merit deference: "Of course, if state law expressly indicates that the ad-
ministrative proceedings are not even 'judicial in nature,' abstention may not be appro-
priate." Id. at 627 n.2 (emphasis added). This formula seems to echo the "plainly bars"
approach, but the Court's emphasis on appellate review as a cure for deficiencies in the
lower tribunal makes any informality objection to that tribunal less significant.
A somewhat more problematical point in Dayton was whether the rejection of a
§ 1983 plaintiff's request for an injunction against continuation of a state administrative
proceeding creates an exhaustion of remedies requirement. Such a requirement had
been expressly invalidated in prior Supreme Court decisions such as Patsy v. Board
of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). Justice Rehnquist's Dayton opinion notes that "[u]nlike
Patsy, the administrative proceedings here are coercive rather than remedial .... 477
U.S. at 628 n.2.
This casually described distinction was explained by the Second Circuit in Univer-
sity Club v. City of New York, 842 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1988), where private membership
clubs sought a declaration that certain antidiscrimination amendments to the city's
human rights laws were unconstitutional and an injunction prohibiting the city's Human
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The impact of this forum allocation is especially troubling in
civil controversies. Although criminal prosecutions would probably
not accord interim or class relief,69 such proceedings generally pro-
vide an opportunity for a defendant to present constitutional chal-
lenges to both the evidence introduced and the statute underlying
the indictment. By contrast, civil cases rerouted from federal to
state courts could fall between the cracks. In these instances, state
forum review of federal claims will be unavailable, uncertain, or in-
ordinately delayed within an ambiguous procedural framework.70
2. Temporary Abstention Where No Pending State Proceeding Is Inter-
rupted.-Application of Younger's nonintervention rule to a Civil
Rights Act case leads to dismissal of the complaint. The term "ab-
stention," though sometimes used in the Younger context, 7' more
precisely refers to a temporary withholding of federal power.
This postponement of federal review may occur when a section
1983 litigant contends that she must forego the exercise of constitu-
tional rights or risk future prosecution under an unclear state stat-
ute. Her request for a declaration striking down this statute as
unconstitutional is not governed by Younger restrictions, which are
applicable only to equitable relief that would disrupt pending pro-
ceedings. 72  Here, prosecution is threatened but has not com-
Rights Commission from enforcing the amendments. Judge Pratt's opinion first estab-
lished that civil proceedings can be coercive because they may culminate in civil penal-
ties. Id. at 42. Secondly, the court concluded that the Commission's proceedings were
coercive, rather than providing remedies for Union League. Id. Abstention was ap-
proved after a careful review of state procedures available to challenge any order the
Commission might issue. Adequacy was not measured against a "plainly bars" rubric,
but instead was examined empirically.
69. See Laycock, supra note 4. Monetary relief would also be unavailable; see infra
subpart II(C).
70. See, e.g., Vairo, supra note 4, at 194-97.
71. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 9 n.9 (1987), where the Court
notes that the various kinds of abstention need not be rigidly differentiated because they
are based on similar considerations. But see Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S.
498, 509 n. 13 (1972) (concluding that abstention is an entirely different question than
the appropriateness of granting injunctions or declarations).
72. In 1908, the Supreme Court approved the granting of injunctive relief by federal
courts against future enforcement of unconstitutional state statutes. See Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 145, 148 (1908). The dissent objected that this holding reduced the states
to mere dependencies of the federal government. Id. at 175 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
As subsequent decisions have stressed, the threat of prosecution must be more
than speculative. The federal plaintiff must satisfy the traditional burden of demonstrat-
ing irreparable harm. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 712 (1977); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466 (1974); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484-85
(1965); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Corp., 312 U.S. 45, 50 (1941); Cline v. Frink Dairy
Co., 274 U.S. 445, 451 (1927). It also should be noted that if a state official commences
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menced. Yet, the district court could insist that state clarification of
the challenged law must precede federal consideration.
Under the abstention doctrine developed in Railroad Commission
of T as v. Pullman Co. ," plaintiff would be directed to ask the state
judiciary to construe the statute so as to modify or obviate the con-
stitutional question. This approach saves federal judicial time and
permits self-correction by the states,74 but is appropriate only where
a prosecution "before any proceedings of substance on the merits" have occurred,
Younger applies. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).
The Ex parte Young doctrine, that federal courts may issue equitable relief against
imminent state proceedings, was further refined in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,
460- 62 (1974). Plaintiff had been threatened with arrest for distributing antiwar leaflets
in a shopping mall; his companion had actually been arrested for handing out these
leaflets in the same location. Steffel claimed violations of his first and fourteenth
amendment rights and requested declaratory relief. Justice Brennan's opinion for a
unanimous court noted that because Steffel was not being prosecuted himself, review of
these claims would neither create duplicative proceedings, nor imply a slur against the
ability of state courts to determine constitutional questions. Id. at 462. Steffel therefore
did not have to meet the stringent Younger requirements in order to invoke federal assist-
ance. These requirements applied only to injunctions or declarations that would disrupt
pending state actions. Id. As discussed supra note 61, Samuels held that the standard for
obtaining declaratory relief was the same standard as the one for obtaining an injunction
in cases where according relief to the federal plaintiff would interrupt a state proceed-
ing. By contrast, Steffel's burden in obtaining federal review was simply to satisfy the
DeclaratoryJudgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1982), by showing that because he
was being compelled to contravene state law, or forego what he believed to be his con-
stitutional rights, he had a vital interest in a district court declaration. 415 U.S. at 462,
475. But see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 366 (1976), where Philadelphia citizens al-
leged persistent violations of the rights of blacks by police. The Mayor and Police Com-
missioner were named as defendants. The Supreme Court held that principles of
federalism blocked the issuance of an injunction against those in charge of an executive
branch of a state or local agency. Id. at 366.
73. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
74. In Pullman, the issue was whether a federal court could enjoin application of the
Texas Railroad Commission's rule that each sleeping car operating in the state must
have a conductor. The district court issued the injunction at the request of the Pullman
Company, the railroads, and the black Pullman porters who would have lost their posi-
tions to white conductors. The district judge did not rule on plaintiffs' constitutional
arguments but found that Texas statutes did not empower the Commission to enact the
rule in question. Id. at 499.
The United States Supreme Court held that the Supreme Court of Texas was the
final authority on that state's law, and that the federal judiciary should abstain from
exercising jurisdiction in areas in which substantive state law is not settled. Id. at 500.
Rather than proceeding to the merits, the district judge should have retained jurisdic-
tion while plaintiff obtained the state's interpretation of the Texas provisions. Id. at 501-
02.
Another timesaving doctrine was developed by the Supreme Court in Colorado
River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). In the
interests of judicial administration, a district court may conserve its judicial resources
and permit the state courts to resolve the issue. Id. at 817. However, this doctrine is
predicated on the availability of a merits determination in the state forum, because it
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the ambiguous law is "obviously susceptible of a limiting construc-
tion."'75 Moreover, Pullman contemplates return of the federal
plaintiff to the district court once an interpretation of the statute has
been issued by the state judiciary. 76
Abstention, in its original sense, is not a final disposition that
bars federal review of constitutional questions. For Younger cases
where district courts are unable to determine whether federal issues
will be heard in a pending state action, Pullman suggests a useful
option. If trial or appellate provisions are amorphous, federal juris-
diction can be retained until state tribunals clarify the meaning of
their procedures. Where the clarification shows that the state forum
will address the federal claims, the section 1983 suit can be dis-
missed.77 While this option does not guarantee a federal disposi-
tion on the merits, a hearing in some forum is assured.
applies where essentially the same property, and some of the same parties and legal
questions, are involved in both federal and state litigation. The state tribunal is in a
position to issue a comprehensive determination that avoids piecemeal litigation. Id. at
817-18.
75. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 (1987). See also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 535 (1965).
However, Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 29
(1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring), indicated that the chance of a construction that might
obviate the constitutional issue should be sufficient to trigger Pullman abstention.
It has also been suggested that unless state courts could construe the statute in one
proceeding, the federal court should exercise its jurisdiction so as to avoid piecemeal
litigation. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378 (1964).
76. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964),
where the district court abstained to give the federal plaintiffs posing a constitutional
challenge to a Louisiana statute the opportunity to obtain an authoritative state interpre-
tation of this provision. Plaintiffs believed that they were required to litigate both state
and federal claims in the state courts. When they attempted to return to the federal
district court after losing in the state litigation, the district judge dismissed the action
because the Louisiana courts had passed on all the issues. Id. at 414. The Supreme
Court reversed, but in doing so established new ground rules for future Pullman liti-
gants. To avoid forfeiting the right to return to the district court, a federal plaintiff must
inform the state courts what his federal claims are in order to facilitate construction of
the statute in light of this challenge. Id. at 421. However, he must carefully avoid sub-
mitting the federal issues to state tribunals for disposition. Id. at 420. Once an interpre-
tation of the statute is obtained, plaintiff may again ask the federal court to rule on its
validity.
77. For an illustration of this option, see infra Part V. Offense to the state by virtue
of merely retaining jurisdiction would hardly outweigh the risk that dismissal would
leave the federal plaintiff without any forum. If the state's interpretation of its proce-
dures is not sufficiently reassuring, the federal judge could hold the case until the pend-
ing state action disposes of the federal claims. At that point, the § 1983 suit would be
terminated by the welcome res judicata effect of the state judgment. Cf. analysis infra
subpart II(C) of Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193 (1988), arguably a precedent for
retaining jurisdiction where interim relief is needed because state consideration of fed-
eral issues may be inordinately delayed.
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B. Ambiguity and the Adequate State Forum in Nonintervention Cases
A standard for evaluating the "adequacy" of a pending state
proceeding might have been predicated on realistic scrutiny. For
example, the Supreme Court could have ruled that dismissal of sec-
tion 1983 litigation is permissible only when a state hearing on the
merits of the federal claims is probable. Alternatively, district
judges could have been invited to take a case-by-case approach.
The "plainly bars" formulation has been chosen instead, signal-
ling to the federal judiciary that the question of adequacy may be
viewed with studied indifference. Even if this formulation is not
read literally, issues essential to federal-state forum allocation are
left unresolved.
1. The Pennzoil Case.-A particularly revealing rendition of
the Supreme Court's adequate-state-procedure analysis is found in
Pennzoil v. Texaco. Texaco had the distinction of being the losing
party in a suit which culminated in the largest damage award in
American history-$10.53 billion, plus interest.78 By a ministerial
procedure under Texas law, Pennzoil could have proceeded after
judgment to secure a lien on Texaco's real property within the
state. 79 A writ of execution against Texaco's assets could also have
been obtained from the clerk of the court issuing the judgment.8 °
The catalyst for Texaco's request for federal intervention was a
state rule providing that execution of a money judgment may be
suspended only if the debtor posts a bond for the amount of the
judgment, plus interests and costs. 8' This would have exceeded $13
billion and, because the company did not have the capacity to raise
such a bond, the business community anticipated that enforcement
of the judgment would commence before state appellate courts
could rule on the merits of the dispute.82 The company's credit and
the price of its stock were affected severely.13 Prior to the entry of
judgment, Texaco filed an action in the federal district court in
White Plains, New York (the site of its corporate headquarters) seek-
ing an injunction against execution of the judgment pending its ap-
78. See Lewin, Pennzoil- Texaco Fight Raised Key Questions, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1987, at
44, col. 1. A Houston, Texas jury arrived at this verdict on the basis of Pennzoil's claim
that Texaco had "tortiously... induced Getty [Oil Company] to breach a contract to sell
its shares to Pennzoil .... " Pennzoil, 481 U.S. 1, 4 (1987).
79. Id.; see TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 52.800-.806 (Vernon 1984).
80. 481 U.S. at 4; see TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. r. 627 (Vernon 1990).
81. 481 U.S. at 5; see TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. r. 364(b) (Vernon 1990).




peal in the Texas courts.
The company succeeded in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York and, on a narrower basis, in the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 5 The district court judge
issued a preliminary injunction restraining Pennzoil from taking
steps to execute the judgment,86 lowered the bond to $1 billion, and
concluded that Texaco's constitutional claims had "a very clear
probability of success" in the state appeal.8 7 The circuit court ruled
that the exercise of federal jurisdiction was proper as to the claim
that the Texas bond and lien laws violated due process and equal
protection."8 Pullman abstention was inapplicable because the rele-
vant bond provisions were clear and had been rigidly applied by
prior Texas decisions.8 9 Nonintervention under Younger was also
ruled inappropriate, both because the state interest in the proceed-
ing was not substantial enough9° and because Texas did not have
"adequate procedures for adjudication of Texaco's federal
84. Id. at 6.
85. Id. at 7, 14; see Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 784
F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1.
86. 481 U.S. at 6 n.5. On the same day that Texaco filed its federal complaint, judg-
ment was entered against Texaco by the local Texas court.
87. Id. at 8 n.7. The district court held that the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply to
Texaco's request, which was based on § 1983. Id. at 7. Under the Supreme Court's
decision in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972), § 1983 is an exception to the
Act. See supra note 59. The Court also concluded that the injunction would not interfere
with Texas' fundamental interests and, therefore, Younger did not apply. Id. at 7.
88. Id. at 8. These claims were not "inextricably intertwined" with the state court
action on the merits, and therefore did not fall within the prohibition of what is com-
monly phrased as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983),
held that federal district court review cannot be used as a substitute for appeal from a
state trial court to state appellate tribunals.
89. Texas courts have refused to reduce supersedeas bonds below the amount dic-
tated by rule 364 even though the party seeking to appeal the decision claimed he could
not post the required amount. See TEx. R. Civ. P. ANN. r. 364 (Vernon 1990).
Indeed, Rule 364's predecessor was similarly construed by Texas courts [in a
decision] .. .refusing to stay foreclosure and sale of [the] home of [a] 66-year-
old woman, whose only income was her old-age pension, because she could not
post [a] supersedeas bond equal to the value of [her] house ....
Texaco, 784 F.2d at 1148 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1.
90. Id. at 1149. The court held that Younger required three preconditions: 1) the
presence of "important," "substantial" or "vital" state interests; 2) an adequate oppor-
tunity for appellant to press his federal claims in state court; and 3) a state proceeding in
process. Id. The circuit court found that if minor state interests were recognized, this
would in effect vitiate § 1983's exempt status under the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at
1149-50. It also found that Texaco could not effectively pursue its constitutional claims
in the state courts in timely fashion. Id. at 1150-51.
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claims." 9 '
Reviewing these procedures, the Second Circuit noted that the
Texas trial judge had no power to alter the mandatory bond and
lien rules and would soon lose jurisdiction of the case.9 2 Although
the state's highest court could issue mandamus to the lower courts,
such an exercise of special discretion was not sufficiently "certain"
to justify abstention."3 Thus, ambiguity in the Texas provisions
could not be discounted in a case where irreparable harm was
imminent. 94
The Supreme Court reversed in a decision that highlighted
Younger, but periodically infused the Pullman rationale. 95 An often-
quoted portion of Younger's comity analysis was used as a framework
for the conclusion that the federal judiciary should have abstained:
"a proper respect for state functions [requires] ... a continuance of
the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate func-
tions in their separate ways ... ."96
The Pennzoil Court also made a glancing reference to the equity
underpinnings of Younger-the "basic" doctrine that no injunction
should issue when the movant has an adequate remedy at law.9 7 Ef-
ficiency was cited as a separate abstention ground, because a federal
opinion on state provisions is not binding on state courts and there-
91. Id. at 1150.
92. Id. at 1150-51. Pennzoil argued that Texaco could apply for a writ of mandamus
from the Texas Supreme Court ordering the trial court not to demand posting of the
bond. The Second Circuit found this unacceptable in view of the discretionary and ex-
ceptional nature of this state procedure, which would not offer Texaco a timely remedy.
Further, even if the writ were granted, it would not necessarily require the lower court to
stay execution. Id. at 1151.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1152. The court found that enforcement of the lien and bond provisions of
Texas law would rapidly produce substantial harm, because Texaco would be unable to
post the required $12 billion security. The company could not continue operating and
would be forced into bankruptcy with consequent layoffs of many of its employees and
heavy losses to stockholders. Injunctive relief was granted; indeed the circuit court held
that the record sustained the issuance of a permanent injunction, so no remand to the
district court was necessary. Id. at 1156.
95. A footnote to the opinion stated that Pullman abstention would not be consid-
ered dispositive, because appellant had not pressed this argument in the Supreme
Court. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 11 n.9. Justice Blackmun's concurrence, however, sug-
gested that the Texas statutes at issue presented "unsettled questions of state law," and
that abstention to allow the state courts to interpret the challenged provisions might
obviate or alter the constitutional issues presented. Id. at 29 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 10 (quoting with approval from Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). The Court found
that Texas had a vital interest in this civil litigation because it involved administration of
the state's judicial system and compliance with state judgments. Id. at 12-13.
97. Id. at 15-17. See infra full analysis of the equity rationale at subpart IV(B).
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fore may become outdated and superfluous if the state disavows it.98
Equity and efficiency concerns were blended in the Court's dis-
cussion of Texas law. Justice Powell's opinion implied that because
Texaco did not present its constitutional claims to state tribunals,99
there could be no certainty that Texas provisions actually placed the
company in the position of forfeiting its appeal in order to shield its
assets. Furthermore, the Texas Constitution's "open courts" provi-
sion, which generally refers to citizen access to the courts and "rem-
edy by due course of law,""° could have been invoked as a basis for
addressing Texaco's grievance.
Thus, state law might provide a remedy for the company's in-
ability to raise a $13 billion bond, obviating any need for a federal
injunction. An injunction would in any event be inefficient because
the federal constitutional question might be avoided by deferring to
the state.' 0 ' The influence of Pullman is as apparent in this reason-
ing as that of Younger; ambiguity in Texas law was pivotal to Justice
Powell's conclusions.10 2
Lack of clarity was also a central theme in Texaco's argument,
but with a reverse refrain. It was not the appeal bond requirement
of Texas that was ambiguous, calling for abstention. Rather, it was
the state's procedural framework for considering the constitutional
claims that was tenuous, calling for federal intervention to prevent
immediate irreparable injury.103
Close analysis of the Court's response to Texaco's inadequate-
procedures argument is instructive. On the rhetorical level, inflexi-
ble key phrases emerge. The federal plaintiff should rely on his de-
fense in the state courts, unless it "plainly appears" that he is barred
from doing so.'0 4 Unless there is "unambiguous authority to the
contrary," the adequacy of the state forum should be assumed.' 0 5
On a second level, the Court's caution is evident. It hedged the
opinion by using multiple negatives: "[T]here is no basis for con-
98. 481 U.S. at 11.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 12 n.10. The Texas Constitution declares: "All courts shall be open, and
every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law." TEx. CONST. art. I, § 13.
101. 481 U.S. at 12.
102. See supra note 95.
103. See supra note 89.
104. 481 U.S. at 14 (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 432 (1979)). See infra discus-
sion at note 109.
105. Justice Powell stressed that Texaco had not tested the waters by presenting its
claim to the state courts. 481 U.S. at 15.
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cluding that the Texas law and procedures were so deficient that
Younger abstention is inappropriate. ' 106
On a third, more expository level, Justice Powell's opinion spe-
cifically refers to these Texas procedures, citing rulings that gener-
ally prohibit making a remedy "contingent on an impossible
condition."' 7 The Pennzoil decision acknowledged that Texaco was
urgently requesting "prompt" relief, but countered by indicating
that such relief could have been forthcoming from the state courts if
the company had trusted them at the outset.108
Although the Court described state provisions, its standard for
evaluating the effectiveness of such provisions discourages district
court inquiry into state forum adequacy. The "plainly bars" rubric
is even more rigid than a prior formulation in Moore v. Sims, 0 9 which
106. Id. at 17. This sentence is the converse of an equally awkward sentence in Sulli-
van v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1969), concluding that ambiguity
should be resolved against the state. See supra note 28, and accompanying text.
107. 481 U.S. at 15. Here, Justice Powell quoted from Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d
918, 921 (Tex. 1984). He also suggested that because rule 364, governing posting of
bonds, applies "unless otherwise provided by law," the bond requirement could be sus-
pended if the Texas trial court decided that its application would violate the United
States Constitution. Id. at 16 n.15 (emphasis in original); see TEx. R. CIv. P. ANN. r. 364
(Vernon 1990). Even if the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case, higher courts
might have had authority to effect such a suspension to defend their appellate jurisdic-
tion. 481 U.S. at 16 n.16.
108. Id. at 16. This approach did not deal directly with Texaco's perception that the
probability of a catastrophic bankruptcy was far greater than the chance of an expedi-
tious constitutional ruling in the state forum. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion,
however, cheerfully noted that "[wihile Texaco cannot.., be arbitrarily denied the right
to a meaningful opportunity to be heard on appeal, this right can be adequately vindi-
cated even if Texaco were forced to file for bankruptcy." Id. at 18.
109. 442 U.S. 415 (1979). Moore involved a challenge to Texas statutes governing the
removal of battered children from their parents' household. Initially, a three-judge fed-
eral district court granted an injunction against further state proceedings. It held that
Younger abstention was unwarranted because of the "multifaceted" pending Texas civil
action, as to which "there is no single state proceeding in which the plaintiffs may look
for relief on constitutional or any other grounds." Sims v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
438 F. Supp. 1179, 1187 (S.D. Tex. 1977). This finding focused attention on the possi-
bility that plaintiffs' claim would be homeless without federal aid, rather than on the
traditional exceptions to Younger abstention. See supra section II(A)(1). The United
States Supreme Court reversed, using the "clearly bars" language and concluding that
the federal plaintiffs had failed to avail themselves of an opportunity to present their
claim in the pending proceeding, using a counterclaim as a vehicle. Moore, 442 U.S. at
25-26 & n.9.
A subsequent ruling, Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n,
457 U.S. 423 (1982), invoked Moore's "clearly bars" language in the context of a federal
challenge to a pending state attorney disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 432. Plaintiffs, a
lawyer and three organizations of attorneys, had persuaded the Third Circuit that the
disciplinary proceeding did not afford a meaningful opportunity to present their consti-
tutional claims. See Garden State Bar Ass'n v. Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 643
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hatched the phrase "clearly bars." The word "clearly" would allow
a section 1983 plaintiff to interpret state law for the purpose of dem-
onstrating that his federal claims would not be considered. The
word "plainly" implies that unwillingness to hear these claims must
virtually be explicit in state law in order to trigger federal review on
the merits.
The use of such bald terminology is troubling for several rea-
sons. If state legislation is amorphous, plaintiff will find it difficult
to demonstrate a plain bar unless the state's highest court has inter-
preted the provisions and acknowledged such an obstacle. To say
that the burden is on the federal plaintiff to demonstrate the inade-
quacy of the state forum does not provide guidance on how to eval-
uate that burden's weight. 0 Yes, it is heavy-but in other contexts
more precise scales have been judicially developed."' Moreover,
district judges who read between the lines of Pennzoil and undertake
F.2d 119 (3rd Cir. 1981). In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court found that the
New Jersey Supreme Court would entertain the constitutional issues, and would con-
sider making review of attorney disciplinary matters an explicit part of its own rules. 457
U.S. at 430. Prior to the petitioning of the Supreme Court for certiorari, the NewJersey
Supreme Court sua sponte examined the federal questions. Id. at 436.
It is interesting to note that both Moore and Middlesex County cited with approval
Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), a case in which abstention was found to be
unwarranted, even though state law did not explicitly bar litigation of the federal plain-
tiffs' claims. See Moore, 442 U.S. at 425; Middlese County, 457 U.S. at 432. In Gibson,
licensed optometrists brought a § 1983 action requesting a federal injunction against
continuation of hearings before the Alabama Board of Optometry. The Board was con-
sidering charges of unprofessional conduct against the federal plaintiffs under an Ala-
bama optometry statute because they were employed by a corporation rather than
practicing independently. 411 U.S. at 567-70. The United States district court found
that the Board's aim was to revoke the licenses of any optometrist who worked for a
business entity, which would have affected half of the practitioners in the state. Id. at
571, 578. Since the Board was composed entirely of optometrists in private practice,
this delicensing plan would have personally benefitted the Board members. The district
court issued the requested injunction on the grounds, among others, that the Board was
constitutionally disqualified from considering the charges against the federal plaintiffs.
Id. at 578-79. In a statement firmly conditioning Younger abstention on the existence of
an adequate state alternative, the Supreme Court held:
Younger v. Harris contemplates the outright dismissal of the federal suit, and the
presentation of all claims ... to the state courts. Such a course naturally pre-
supposes the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent state
tribunal the federal issues involved. Here the predicate for a Younger v. Harris
dismissal was lacking, for.., the State Board of Optometry was incompetent by
reason of bias to adjudicate the issues pending before it.
Id. at 577.
110. It is somewhat circular to contend that the burden (the degree of persuasiveness
of plaintiff's evidence) is synonymous with the fact to be proven (state law plainly bars
redress).
111. For a thorough discussion of burdens of proof such as preponderance of the
evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, see Un-
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to review state law ambiguity will still face basic unresolved ques-
tions about how complete and available "adequate" redress must
be.
2. The Unresolved Questions: Speed and Efficiency of the Remedy.-If
a federal plaintiff might obtain eventual relief in a pending state pro-
ceeding, is the adequacy requirement satisfied? Pennzoil appears to
answer this question with an enthusiastic affirmation. Yet, Congress
has explicitly rejected such an approach as to cases involving the
Tax Injunction Act, 1 2 which precludes district courts from en-
joining state tax collections only if that state provides a "plain,
speedy and efficient remedy." '" 3
It might be argued that a looser standard is applicable where a
plaintiff invokes a statute without such a specification. Or, the effec-
tiveness criterion could be read into section 1983, which was passed
in order to "interpose the federal courts between the States and the
people, as guardians of the people's federal rights . ,, 1" Such a
reading would parallel and implement the Supreme Court's conclu-
sion in Mitchum v. Foster that section 1983 is an "expressly author-
ized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Law." 5 This conclusion was
reached even though the text of section 1983 does not explicitly
permit district courts to enjoin pending state proceedings. Mitchum
reasoned that preserving the power to intervene in state suits was
essential to accomplishment of the congressional purpose in
promulgating the civil rights legislation." 6
In the framework of federal challenges to state tax assessments,
the Supreme Court has methodically tested the promptness and ef-
fectiveness of available state remedies.' This approach was trans-
lated into a section 1983 context in the pre-Pennzoil case of Hernandez
derwood, The Thumb on the Scales ofJustice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE
LJ. 1299, 1303 (1977).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
113. Id. The Act reads in full: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or re-
strain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy may be had in the court of such State." Id.
114. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). See supra note 59.
115. 407 U.S. at 243. For a description of the Anti-Injunction Act, see supra note 52.
116. 407 U.S. at 242. See supra note 59.
117. See, e.g., Tully v. Griffin, 429 U.S. 68, 73-74 (1976). This test has been used not
only as to requests for injunctive relief, but also where federal courts have been asked
for a declaratory judgment that a state tax assessment is void. See Hillsborough v. Crom-




v. Finley. "8 In Hernandez, the federal plaintiffs were also defendants
in a pending civil suit brought by the Illinois Department of Public
Aid, which sought return of public assistance funds on the ground
that assets had been fraudulently concealed." 9
In that earlier phase, a three-judge federal district court had
held that parts of the Illinois Attachment Act that subjected plain-
tiffs to prejudgment seizure of their property violated the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause.12 0 All Illinois court clerks and
sheriffs were enjoined from issuing or serving writs of attach-
ment. 12  The United States Supreme Court reversed, ruling in Trai-
nor v. Hernandez 122 that
disruption of suits by the State... when combined with the
negative reflection on the State's ability to adjudicate fed-
eral claims that occurs whenever a federal court enjoins a
pending... proceeding, leads us to the conclusion that the
interests of comity and federalism on which Younger... pri-
marily rest[s] apply in full force here. 23
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that abstention would be inap-
propriate unless state procedure affords speedy and certain relief. 124
The majority did not dismiss the case, however. It sent back to the
district court the question of whether the federal plaintiffs could
have presented their constitutional claims in the pending state
proceeding.12 5
On remand in Hernandez v. Finley, the district court found that in
order to prevent the plaintiffs from continuing their federal litiga-
118, 471 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Il. 1978), aff'd mem. sub nom. Quern v. Hernandez, 440
U.s. 951 (1979).
119. Hernandez v. Danaher, 405 F. Supp. 757, 758-59 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd sub nom.
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
120. Id. at 762.
121. Id.
122. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
123. Id. at 446.
124. Id. at 469 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
There should be no abstention unless the state procedure affords a plain,
speedy, and efficient remedy for the federal wrong; indeed .. . Younger ...
acknowledges this as the fundamental requirement in application of the absten-
tion doctrine.... In my judgment, when a state procedure is challenged, an
adequate forum must be one that is sufficiently independent of the alleged un-
constitutional procedure to judge it impartially and to provide prompt relief if
the procedure is found wanting .... [W]here the remedy is 'uncertain,' federal
jurisdiction exists.
Id. For a discussion of Justice Stevens' dissent, see Comment, Limiting the Younger Doc-
trine: A Critique and Proposal, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1318, 1345-46 (1979).
125. 431 U.S. at 447-48.
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tion, the state must provide a competent tribunal to determine the
federal issues, certainty in the availability of relief, and a "meaning-
ful opportunity to appeal."' 26 Nonintervention principles were in-
applicable because Illinois provisions governing the hearing and
appeal of challenges to the prejudgment attachments did not afford
a speedy and certain remedy.' 27 The Supreme Court summarily af-
firmed,' 28 indicating that the district court was not precluded from
searching for an effective state response.'2 9 Yet, the subsequent
126. 471 F. Supp. 516, 519 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd mem. sub norn. Quern v. Hernandez,
440 U.S. 951 (1979).
127. Id. at 520.
128. 440 U.S. 951 (1979) (mem.).
129. Id. A thoughtfil analysis of ambiguity in state law may be found in Judge
Wellford's concurring opinion in the pre-Pennzoil case of Traughber v. Beauchane, 760
F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1985). The federal plaintiffs brought a § 1983 case after their prop-
erty was twice seized in a Tennessee prejudgment attachment. Alleging that the attach-
ment contravened fourteenth amendment rights and prevented them from continuing
their real estate business or obtaining loans, the Traughbers sought declaratory and
injunctive relief. Id. at 675. The Sixth Circuit held that neither Younger nor Pullman
precluded exercise of district court jurisdiction, because the plaintiffs merely sought
protection against a private party's unconstitutional use of state law, and because the
state courts had already deferred to the federal judiciary to determine the constitutional-
ity of the attachment. Id. at 681-82.
The concurrence noted that plaintiffs had no state appeal as of right to challenge
the summary attachment because the state judge had refused to certify his decision up-
holding this attachment as a final order, or to allow an interlocutory appeal. Id. at 684
(Wellford, J., concurring). Appellate review after a final decision in the underlying tort
case would be too late to prevent irreparable harm. An extraordinary appeal under the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure was "inadequate due to its discretionary na-
ture. ... There is an uncertain and speculative state remedy, and despite diligent efforts
by plaintiffs, no state forum has been afforded them within a reasonable time . I..." d.
at 686 (Wellford, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The opinion seems to balance the
"serious" challenge and persistent efforts of plaintiffs against the distinct possibility that
their livelihood would be lost before any state court hearing on their federal claims.
See also the pre-Pennzoil decision in Lessard v. Schmidt, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D.
Wis. 1976), concluding that there were practical problems with raising constitutional
challenges and having them decided in a Wisconsin civil commitment proceeding. Stat-
utes were "presumed constitutional unless proved otherwise beyond a reasonable
doubt," and the right to appeal from a determination of insanity was doubtful. Id. at
1320. Cf. McKinstry v. Genesee County Circuit Judges, 669 F. Supp. 801 (E.D. Mich.
1987), where an indigent father in a child support case was imprisoned after being found
in civil contempt. The state defendant sought federal court redress, alleging that the
state judge had failed to inform him of his constitutional right to a court-appointed at-
torney. Id. at 803. In a decision sprinkled with paragraphs written entirely in capital
letters, the court held that it could not abstain because Michigan judges were insistent
on following state rather than United States Supreme Court precedent on the constitu-
tional issue. Id. at 810.
It should be noted that federal plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of inadequate fo-
rum arguments if they have previously failed to invoke readily available rescue proce-
dures. See, e.g., Donkor v. City of New York Human Resources Admin., 673 F. Supp.
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Pennzoil opinion has miniaturized the adequacy requirement by sub-
stituting presumptions about state law for realistic scrutiny.
C. Deakins v. Monaghan: A Methodology For Handling Restrictive or
Ambiguous State Provisions
Limitations on the nonintervention doctrine, introduced in an
intriguing post-Pennzoil decision, suggest a methodology for treating
unreceptive state provisions that may not accord timely considera-
tion of section 1983 issues. In Deakins v. Monaghan,'3 ° the Supreme
Court addressed the question of what action federal judges should
take if a section 1983 litigant could obtain only partial relief in pend-
ing state proceedings.
Owners of a construction business had instituted a federal suit
against New Jersey officials, seeking injunctive relief and damages
resulting from an allegedly unconstitutional search of their business
and seizure of documents.' 3 ' At the time the district court com-
plaint was filed, a state grand jury investigation of the plaintiffs was
ongoing.' 3 2  As the case travelled through the federal courts, 3 3
plaintiffs were indicted in New Jersey, and decided to pursue their
request for an injunction in the pending state action rather than in
the section 1983 suit.1 34 However, they represented to the Supreme
Court that if the complaint were remanded to the federal district
court, they would seek a stay of section 1983 monetary claims until
the completion of the state proceedings.' 35
1221, 1226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). But see also supra note 68, distinguishing between coer-
cive and remedial state provisions.
130. 484 U.S. 193 (1988).
131. Monaghan v. Deakins, 798 F.2d 632, 633 (3d Cir. 1986). The complaint alleged
that defendant officials had sought plaintiffs' aid in connection with an ongoing investi-
gation of government corruption, and had "threatened to focus their investigation on
Monaghan and his businesses if he did not cooperate." Id. at 634. Monaghan replied
that he had been advised not to answer questions without his attorney present.
Monaghan's partner also was allegedly threatened. Subsequently, defendants occupied
plaintiffs' business premises for eight hours, compelled every person who happened to
be present to produce identification, and seized privileged documents. Id.
132. Id. at 634. The federal plaintiffs had not yet been indicted, but defendants' mo-
tion for dismissal of the federal complaint on the basis of the pending state grand jury
proceeding was granted by the district court. Id. at 635. Plaintiffs' motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction mandating the return of the seized documents was denied. Id.
133. On appeal, the Third Circuit unanimously reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs'
monetary claims, holding that these claims could not be determined in the state grand
jury investigation. Id. at 635; id. at 639 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The majority of the panel also ruled that this ongoing grand jury investigation
could not be characterized as a pending proceeding for Younger purposes. Id. at 637.
134. Deakins, 484 U.S. at 198-99.
135. Id. at 199.
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The Supreme Court noted that because the request for equita-
ble relief had become moot, 136 the remaining issue was whether the
damages claim should be stayed rather than dismissed. 3 7 The jus-
tices concluded that the federal courts had "no discretion to dismiss
claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the state
proceeding."' 38
Yet no immediate federal adjudication on the merits was per-
mitted. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court approved a wait-
and-see stay so that the state prosecution could continue without
federal intervention.139 As more fully explained in Justice White's
concurring opinion, immediate federal action would be harmful in
that any ruling on damages could determine the factual and legal
questions at stake in the state prosecution and have a res judicata
effect there.' 4 ° The concurrence suggested that this intrusion on
state proceedings could be at least as disruptive as the issuance of a
declaration without an accompanying monetary award. 141
On the other hand, outright dismissal would also be unwar-
ranted because damages "may not be obtained in any pending state
proceeding."' 42 And even if the state court were to agree that a
constitutional violation had occurred, the statute of limitations
might have run by that time and the prior dismissal would foreclose
return to the federal court on the monetary issue.' 43
It is significant that none of the Justices viewed the possibility of
an independent state court suit for damages as an adequate rem-
edy. The Court noted that "[b]ecause the state criminal proceeding
can provide only equitable relief, any action for damages would nec-
essarily be separate," and would require initiation of a new state
136. Id.
137. Id. at 195.
138. Id. at 202 (footnote omitted). The Court indicated that dismissal of the damages
claim would have been improper even if Younger were found to apply to pending grand
jury investigations.
139. Id. at 202-03.
140. Id. at 208 (White, J., concurring). The federal judgment on damages might de-
termine that evidence was seized in violation of the fourth amendment, that sixth
amendment rights were violated during the interrogation, or that fifth amendment
rights were somehow violated.
141. Id. at 209 (White, J., concurring). Under Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971),
Younger's companion case, the federal district court would generally have no discretion
to issue a declaration as to evidence being used in an ongoing state prosecution. Id. at
73. See supra note 61. It would therefore be anomalous to permit such a declaration if a
damages claim were added to it.
142. 484 U.S. at 206 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 203 n.7; id. at 206 (White, J., concurring).
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action.' 44 The federal plaintiffs were expected to pursue these ini-
tiatives,' 45 yet the district court was instructed to wait in the wings
and pass judgment later on whether the constitutional claims re-
ceived appropriate consideration in the state forum.' 4 6 Justice
Blackmun declined to call this retention of jurisdiction "hovering;"
as suggested by the state, and expressed confidence that the district
court would "hold up its end of the comity bargain. . .
At first glance, the Deakins holding might appear unremarkable.
The scope of the pending prosecution was too narrow to provide
the relief requested by the federal plaintiffs, and the wait-and-see
approach approved by Justice Blackmun effected a reasonable bal-
ance between federal and state interests.
Closer analysis, however, reveals that Deakins has more complex
ramifications. Note that an adequate state forum on the monetary
claims was not assumed, although defendant officials had extended
an "invitation" to utilize that forum. 14 Without any indication that
state law "plainly barred" the claims, the Supreme Court nonethe-
less insured further federal scrutiny of the state damages remedy.
One hypothesis might relate this deviation from the letter of
Pennzoil solely to respondents' request for damages instead of eq-
uity. Under this theory, the "plainly bars" rubric comes into play
only if an injunction or declaration is sought; monetary redress is so
different that new rules of federalism involving heightened scrutiny
of ambiguous state law must be invented. The district court should
wait and see if the state forum is adequate, even when state officials
aver that money damages are available.
Neither the majority nor the concurring opinion in Deakins sup-
ports the thesis that a distinction between types of remedies is im-
pelled by consideration of federalism. Justice Blackmun disclaimed
any intention of deciding the "awkwardly presented" issue of
144. Id. at 204.
145. The Justices did not discuss the possibility that plaintiffs could seek district court
adjudication as soon as the state prosecution had terminated.
146. 484 U.S. at 202. One district court has hinted that state courts need only hear,
not listen: "applicability of the Younger doctrine depends on the federal plaintiffs having
the opportunity to present their constitutional claims to the state courts and not on the
degree to which a state trial court deliberates regarding those claims ..... Cook v.
Franklin County Mun. Court, 596 F. Supp. 490, 504 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
147. 484 U.S. at 203. See also Allen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry, 835 F.2d 100
(5th Cir. 1988), where plaintiffs sought both monetary and equitable relief. The circuit
court applied a stay approach, invoking Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 835 F.2d at 104. See supra note 74 for a discussion
of Colorado River.
148. 484 U.S. at 204.
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whether Younger applies to monetary requests, 49 and instead fo-
cused on pendency. Justice White pointed out that district court
discussion of damages would probably contain declaratory state-
ments about the law or facts involved in the pending state action
that would be highly intrusive.150 The concurrence concluded that
Younger should ordinarily bar such offenses to comity for the same
reasons that militate against enjoining a pending prosecution. 15 1
Thus, the inability of the federal plaintiff to obtain a particular
remedy in a pending state proceeding is the critical factor in Deakins,
not the nature of that remedy.' 12 The Supreme Court has narrowly
circumscribed injunctive and declaratory relief where a state action
is pending, 153 while permitting a declaration under far more permis-
sive standards in the absence of an ongoing state prosecution.' 54
When the federal suit is the only one that has been filed,' 55 there is
no duplication of judicial resources and no slur on the state's ability
to adjudicate constitutional questions. 156
If pendency is the key to Deakins, then the case adds a vital new
element to adequacy jurisprudence. When the state proceeding is
not coterminous with the federal suit, the district court must retain
jurisdiction even though plaintiff could initiate a new state action to
obtain the redress he seeks. Arguably meritorious section 1983
claims cannot be dismissed if the relief requested-whatever that re-
lief may be-is broader than the ongoing state action could
accord. 1
5 7
149. Id. at 202 n.6.
150. Id. at 208 (White, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 208-09 (White, J., concurring).
152. See id. at 202 (circuit rule requiring lower court to stay rather than dismiss
"claims that are not cognizable in the parallel state proceeding," was "sound").
153. See supra discussion at section II(A)(I).
154. See supra note 72.
155. But see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975), discussed supra note 72 (hold-
ing that swift institution of a state proceeding before matters of "substance" have oc-
curred in federal court brings Younger comity principles into play).
156. These comity rationales are discussed more extensively infra at subpart IV(C).
157. Justice Powell's Pennzoil opinion did not wrestle with this aspect of pendency be-
cause he concluded that the company could have asserted its bond and lien arguments
in the original Texas trial court, or perhaps on appeal from that trial court's judgment.
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 16-17 nn.15-16 (1987). An earlier decision,
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425 n.9 (1979), stressed that a counterclaim in a pending
state civil action could encompass plaintiff's federal questions. See supra note 109.
The Third Circuit, treating claims that could not all be heard in a pending state
proceeding, has used a bifurcation approach. See Williams v. Red Bank Bd. of Educ.,
662 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1981). In Williams, a pre-Deakins decision, a teacher alleging
constitutional violations by a school board sought an injunction against its prosecution
of tenure-related charges against her. She also sought damages, and attorney's fees. Id.
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This approach would have far-reaching implications in section
1983 cases where equitable, interlocutory relief is needed, for exam-
ple because enforcement of an unconstitutional state penal statute
precipitates business losses for the defendant that might not be
compensable even if the statute is struck down at the prosecution's
finale.' District court judges who read Deakins as a refinement of
Pennzoil's general rubric may be less reluctant to grant interim relief
that is currently unavailable in a pending proceeding.'5 9
Deakins also can be read to support closer scrutiny and retention
of federal jurisdiction where it appears that state consideration of
section 1983 issues will be inordinately delayed. Such delays are
more likely to occur in civil proceedings than in criminal prosecu-
tions.' 60 In some instances, interim relief may not be immediately
warranted. Yet, ambiguous procedures governing the state suit may
make it difficult to determine whether federal claims will be heard
before irreparable damage occurs. A wait-and-see methodology is
particularly appropriate under such circumstances for the very rea-
sons cited in Deakins. It avoids immediate and premature interven-
tion while respecting the "virtually unflagging" obligation of the
federal judiciary to adjudicate constitutional questions.' 6 '
III. STANDARDLESS SCRUTINY: CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
PREDICATED ON SECTION 1983 PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS CLAIMS
In the area of constitutional torts, federal plaintiffs are not ask-
ing for equitable relief against pending state proceedings; instead,
they generally seek damage awards that may be limited or unavaila-
ble in state tribunals. Federal judges reviewing tort claims are
therefore freed of the constraints traditionally imposed on dispens-
ing equity as they look to section 1983 for direction.
at 1011. Only dismissal of charges and back pay could be awarded in the state proceed-
ing, and therefore jurisdiction could be retained as to the damage remedy. Id. at 1023.
158. An injunction could be tailored to allow the plaintiff to continue in business with-
out interfering with the conduct of the prosecution. For a persuasive discussion of the
inadequacy of criminal prosecutions where a federal plaintiff demonstrates the need for
interim and prospective aid, see generally Laycock, supra note 6. Professor Laycock also
argues that relief should be permitted on the basis of a class composed of a named
plaintiff who is the object of a state prosecution and other class members who have not
yet been prosecuted. Id. at 220.
159. See supra note 59.
160. See supra note 6.
161. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1988) (citing with approval Colo-
rado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 817 (1976),
discussed supra note 74).
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The remedies provided by section 1983 are described in broad
categories-"an action at law ... or other proper proceeding for
redress."' 6 2 Monroe v. Pape' 63 answered in the fourth amendment
context the question of whether such relief should be withheld if
plaintiff's injury could be compensated by the state in which it oc-
curred. The Supreme Court's holding was sweeping and unequivo-
cal: "It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would
give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state rem-
edy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked."' 64
A diametrically opposite view dominates in cases where a dis-
trict court judge must decide whether a common law tort has risen
to the level of a deprivation without due process of law. The availa-
bility of an adequate state forum in such instances may extinguish
what might be termed a nascent constitutional violation. In a series
of opinions involving procedural due process, the Supreme Court
has disposed of a substantive question-the existence of a constitu-
tional right-by using jurisdictional doctrine. 65
The federalism dilemma posed by common law torts is an obvi-
ous one. These torts frequently result in injury to liberty or prop-
erty. If the offender acted under color of state law, the controversy
would arguably qualify for federal judicial consideration under sec-
tion 1983.166 By deporting the underlying cause of action, the dis-
trict court achieves two familiar aims: it decreases its workload and
avoids intervention in state functions.
The ranks of section 1983 suitors could have been thinned by a
de minimis rule requiing quantification of the loss where possible
and precluding cases falling below the line. The undisputed facts in
162. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
163. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The complaint alleged that petitioners' home had been
invaded by 13 police officers who forced petitioners to stand naked while every room
was ransacked. These officers had no search or arrest warrants. After the search, Mr.
Monroe was taken to the police station and detained on "open" charges for 10 hours.
He was not permitted to call his attorney or his family, and he was released without
criminal charges being lodged against him. Id. at 169.
164. Id. at 183.
165. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422 (1982); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). See also infra subpart III(A).
166. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has classified certain types
of harm that appear to implicate liberty or property as nonconstitutional. See, e.g., Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), which held that a person whose photograph is circulated
by the police as an "active shoplifter," id. at 695, may suffer an injury to his reputation,
but that this injury is not cognizable under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 712.
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Parratt v. Taylor 1 67 would have facilitated the formulation of a trivial-
ity barrier to jurisdiction. Taylor, a prisoner, used his inmate ac-
count to purchase hobby materials (valued at $23.50), which were
somehow misplaced after they arrived at the prison complex.' He
brought suit pursuant to section 1983 seeking recovery of this loss.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court, however, regarded a
de minimis approach as foreclosed by the failure of Congress to es-
tablish any monetary cut-off under the statute that provides a juris-
dictional basis for section 1983 cases. 169 Instead, Parratt found that
the hobby kit was property, that the loss resulting from negligence
constituted a deprivation, and that Nebraska prison officials had ac-
ted under color of law in causing this deprivation.17
0
Nonetheless, the loss was not incurred "without due process of
law."' 7 ' The Court reached that conclusion by examining the ade-
quacy of Nebraska's tort remedies in light of procedural due process
demands.' 72 This examination neither incorporated a hard-line
"clearly bars" rubric nor adopted the realistic scrutiny of Hathorn.
Indeed, the Justices created no standard to inform district courts as
to how carefully they should look for a meaningful state remedy or
how to measure the adequacy of state compensation.t73
With respect to constitutional torts, two kinds of inadequacy
could be relevant. First, the state may be unwilling to consider the
claim or may delay inordinately any possible relief.'74 Second, the
potential recovery available under state provisions may be nominal
or substantially less than could be awarded under federal law.
For a number of doctrinal and practical reasons, the Justices
have not routinely required that state and federal compensation
167. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
168. Id. at 530. At the time that Taylor's packages arrived, he was in isolation and was
not permitted to have the hobby materials. Normal prison procedures called for an
inmate to be notified of a package's arrival. At that point, he would either pick up the
package or have it delivered, signing a receipt in either instance. However, because of
Taylor's segregation, his hobby kit was signed for by two prison employees, one civilian
and one inmate. Upon his release from segregation, Taylor inquired into the wherea-
bouts of his packages but they were never found. Id.
169. Id. at 529; see 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
170. 451 U.S. at 536-37.
171. Id. at 543.
172. Id.
173. The Court's sidestepping is unfortunate given their explicit purpose in Parratt of
"once more put[ting] our shoulder to the wheel hoping to be of greater assistance to
courts confronting such a fact situation than it appears we have been in the past." Id. at
533 -34.
174. See infra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
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levels match.' 7 5 However, their careless treatment of the gap be-
tween federal and state redress has failed to identify any class of
cases in which federal interests diverge significantly from common-
law concerns. In such cases, state relief should not be deemed ade-
quate unless it bears a substantial similarity to the redress available
under section 1983.171 The lack of Supreme Court guidance has
resulted in conflicting assumptions and rulings by lower courts left
without a coherent standard for adequacy measurements. 77
A. Adequate State Remedies Under Parratt and its Descendants
Although defendants in Parratt had no intention of inflicting
any deprivation upon plaintiff, the majority nonetheless held that
the loss of the hobby kit gave rise to deprivation of a property right
protected by the Constitution. 178 The relief given by this holding
was to some extent whisked away again by the Court's conclusion
that random and unauthorized acts cannot be prevented by states in
advance, but can be expiated by an appropriate post-deprivation
hearing.' 79 Note the source of the governmental wrong under this
analysis. Because the misconduct did not emanate from official pol-
icy,18 0 the state errs only if and when it denies subsequent remedial
175. See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
176. See infra section III(B)(2).
177. See infra subpart III(C).
178. 451 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1981).
179. Id. at 543-44. Parratt has been compared to cases arising under the fifth amend-
ment's requirement of just compensation for taking of private property by the govern-
ment. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172 (1985), which held that "the State's action is not 'complete' in the sense of
causing a constitutional injury 'unless or until the State fails to provide an adequate
postdeprivation remedy for the property loss.' " Id. at 195 (quoting Parratt's successor
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n.12 (1984)). Such failure to provide redress was
recognized as unconstitutional as to regulatory takings in First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (church was denied the
right to put recreational structures on its floodplain property). First English and Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), in which an invalid exaction was
imposed on an owner's application to enlarge a beach bungalow, both held that the right
to a just compensation remedy for the property owner accrued immediately on the en-
actment of the offending regulation. 482 U.S. at 306-07; 483 U.S. at 839.
180. An injury inflicted by a government employee whose acts represent official policy
may give rise to municipal liability under Monell v. New York City Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Indeed, § 1983 suits may be predicated on an infor-
mal governmental custom. Id. at 690-91. Thus, a high executive official may be charac-
terized as a policy-maker whose unconstitutional decision could be an adequate basis for
imposing governmental liability. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
480 (1986) (county prosecutor made a considered decision based on his understanding
of the law which caused petitioner's fourth amendment rights to be violated; § 1983
liability was thus chargeable to the county); Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801
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process. Thus, the fourteenth amendment would not become "'a
font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may al-
ready be administered by the states.' "181
Such an approach could be defensible in cases where these
"systems" offered both plenary consideration and meaningful com-
pensation for the violation. However, no standard was provided for
measuring the adequacy of state redress. The Court merely
guarded the federal portals by indicating that state remedies may be
sufficient even if they do not give "all the relief ... available ...
under § 1983. '"I8" Nebraska tort claims procedure did not permit
suit against individual employees, punitive damages, or a jury
trial.' 83 These preclusions could have affected the outcome of a suit
(by changing the defendant and fact-finder) as well as the amount of
the recovery. Nonetheless, the potential for obtaining the full value
of lost property remained.
This potential was deemed insignificant in subsequent deci-
sions. Hudson v. Palmer'" expanded the crucial conclusion that state
redress and section 1983 relief need not be coterminous. In Hudson,
a Virginia prisoner alleged that a guard had intentionally and un-
necessarily destroyed personal property, including legal papers,
during a search of his cell.' 8 ' The majority held that the prisoner's
inability to obtain "the full amount ... he might receive in a § 1983
(I st Cir. 1985) (jury finding of municipal liability was supported by facts showing the city
was grossly negligent in failing to train its officers). But cf. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808 (1985) (proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to
impose liability unless the facts show injury was caused by an existing unconstitutional
municipal policy attributable to a municipal policy maker).
See generally Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 5, 41-67 (1980) (mar-
shalling arguments that damage awards against individual employees in tort cases are
generally less appropriate and less effective as deterrents than equitable relief or assess-
ment of damages against governmental entities).
181. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544 (quoting with approval from Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,
701 (1976)).
182. Id. at 544. Justice Marshall's dissent raises the question of whether a plaintiff
who had exhausted prison grievance procedures would know about the state tort claims
provisions, and whether prison officials had a duty to inform him of the remedies. Id. at
555-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 543-44. Ironically, these same preclusions are present in the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 2402, 2412, 2671-80 (1988), and were character-
ized as inadequacies in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20-23 (1980). Carlson ruled that
the plaintiff could bring a private cause of action directly under the eighth amendment
against prison officials who allegedly failed to provide medical attention to a prisoner,
plaintiff's deceased son. d. at 23. The fact that the federal statute precluded punitive
damages and jury trials made it a "much less effective" tool than other existing reme-
dies. Id. at 22.
184. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
185. Id. at 535.
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action" through state remedies did not mean that these remedies
were inadequate. 8 6 The opinion did not attempt to scrutinize state
law with precision, nor did it give guidance as to the permissible size
or nature of such a gap.
Two years later the Supreme Court sharply constricted federal
intake of constitutional torts and satisfied internal critics' 8 7 by re-
scinding the possibility that a plaintiff complaining only of negli-
gence by a state officer could establish a due process claim for relief.
Daniels v. Williams,'"" like its progenitors, involved a state prisoner.
Plaintiff unsuccessfully invoked a liberty interest 8 9 after injuring his
back because of a pillow negligently left on a stairwell by a prison
deputy.'1° A companion case arising from more troubling facts, Da-
186. Id. at 535. Settling a point which had divided the lower courts, the Supreme
Court unanimously held that intentional deprivations of property were subject to the
Parratt jurisdictional limitations. The state cannot control in advance the intentional acts
of its employees where such acts are random and unauthorized, but postdeprivation
procedures could satisfy due process demands. Id. at 533.
187. In his Parratt concurrence, Justice Powell had suggested that the majority was
naively ignoring the prospect of a flood of trivial § 1983 litigations resulting from its
decision. He predicted that "despite the breadth of state tort remedies .... claims [for
negligent invasions of liberty or property] will be more numerous than might at first be
supposed." 451 U.S. at 550-51 (Powell, J., concurring). The concurrence cited as an
example the pre-Parratt case of Kent v. Prasse, 385 F.2d 406 (3d Cir. 1967) (per curiam),
where a state prisoner forced to work on a defective machine sustained an injury which
was not compensable under state law. 451 U.S. at 551. The prisoner's federal suit
against prison officials was dismissed because, among other reasons, there was no inten-
tional violation nor any failure to enforce state law. 385 F.2d at 407. Parratt appears to
reject this approach and would therefore have permitted such a federal suit. But Cf.
Burnham, Separating Constitutional and Common-Law Torts: A Critique and a Proposed Constitu-
tional Theory of Duty, 73 MINN. L. REV. 515, 535-37 (1989) (suggesting that negligent
deprivations without due process may be more abusive than intentional violations with-
out due process).
188. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
189. The United States Supreme Court has held that Parratt applies to liberty in-
fringement claims if such deprivations cannot be anticipated and must therefore be expi-
ated by proper postdeprivation process. Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 990 (1990).
The court stressed:
It is true that Parratt and Hudson concerned deprivations of property. It is
also true that Burch's interest in avoiding six months' confinement is of an or-
der different from inmate Parratt's interest in mail-order materials valued at
$23.50. But the reasoning of Parratt and Hudson emphasizes the State's inability
to provide predeprivation process because of the random and unpredictable
nature of the deprivation, not the fact that only property losses were at stake.
Id. at 987.
190. 474 U.S. at 328. Danies overruled Parratt's prior conclusion that "mere lack of
care" could constitute a due process violation. Id. at 330-31. The majority reserved for
future cases the issue of whether grossly negligent or reckless conduct could form the
basis for a Parratt claim. Id. at 334 n.3. However, the court reaffirmed that § 1983
required no state-of-mind proof, only a showing of a constitutional violation. The na-
ture of the constitutional right asserted determines whether negligent conduct provides
1991]
170 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50:131
vidson v. Cannon, 9' held that no deprivation of liberty under section
1983 had occurred where prison officials failed to protect an inmate
from assault by another inmate, despite prior warning of such an
attack. 192
In a surprising concurrence in both cases, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that the results reached by the majority were correct because
state remedies were in fact adequate.'"3 Yet an examination of the
applicable state law in Davidson indicates that the federal plaintiff
had a right to sue but no chance of obtaining relief regardless of the
merits of his claims.' 94 A New Jersey statute prohibited recovery
from the state and its employees for harm inflicted on a prisoner by
other inmates. 195 This did not mean, according to Justice Stevens,
that the section 1983 action should proceed. The availability of par-
ticular defenses could not invalidate the state's post-injury
processes: statute of limitations objections can dispose of tort litiga-
tion, and by analogy, provision of an immunity defense in Davidson
could defeat recovery without rendering the state's post-deprivation
procedure constitutionally defective." 6
This conclusion begs the question that Parratt created. If a
property or liberty interest exists and can be divested only by an
adequate corrective response, there appears to be an underlying
presumption that state redress must be available in the general class
a sufficient basis for the claim. Id. at 330. A negligence claim cannot rise to the level of
a constitutional right under the due process clause. Id. at 335-36. Yet scienter is not
altogether irrelevant to § 1983 suits. See supra note 180 (discussion of municipal
liability).
191. 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
192. Id. at 347-48. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Davidson suggested that defendant
had been reckless and that, if necessary, a remand could provide further evidentiary
confirmation. Id. at 356 -57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He noted also that because "de-
liberate indifference," as demonstrated by a prison officer's denial of medical aid to an
inmate, could violate the eighth amendment, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104
(1976), no higher requirement should be imposed on plaintiffs proffering a claim of a
liberty infringement under the due process clause. 474 U.S. at 357. Justice Brennan's
Davidson dissent similarly concluded that proof of recklessness should be enough to
meet the procedural due process standard. Id. at 349 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193. As to Daniels, the Fourth Circuit had determined that plaintiff had a remedy for
the alleged negligence under Virginia law. Justice Stevens' concurrence deferred to this
finding, despite Daniel's "vigorous" argument that sovereign immunity would have de-
feated his claim in the state courts. 474 U.S. at 341 (Stevens J., concurring).
194. 474 U.S. at 358-59 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 358. See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2(b)(4) (West 1982).
196. Id. at 342 (Stevens, J., concurring). The concurrence also attempted an analogy
to contributory negligence defenses-a clearly distinguishable context, because it
presumes that plaintiff is at fault in incurring the injury. Id. Davidson's claim was that
he was a helpless assault victim. Id. at 346.
ADEQUATE STATE FORUM
of cases that includes the federal plaintiff's claim. A particular liti-
gant's failure to follow a valid procedural rule (such as a statute-of-
limitations provision) might defeat his claim. Nonetheless, it would
not automatically defeat the whole class.' 97 Under the state law ap-
plicable in Davidson, all prisoners assaulted by other inmates would
be blocked from recovery even if guards looked on without
intervening.' 9
8
Posit a section 1983 plaintiff with an impressive bouquet of vir-
tues. He has been deliberately deprived of a large amount of prop-
erty by state officers, and to find redress he would faithfully follow
every procedural requirement that the state prescribes. Can the
federal judiciary dismiss the case because he has a purely abstract
right to file suit in state court, even though state law already pre-
cludes any possible recovery? If so, Monroe v. Pape becomes an
ironic counterpoint. 199 There, as previously noted, the Supreme
Court held that because federal redress is specifically intended to be
supplementary to the state remedy, plaintiff could invoke the Civil
Rights Act without seeking a state forum.20 In Monroe, the state had
outlawed unreasonable searches and seizures, but the majority
found that this fact was irrelevant to plaintiff's choice-of-forum
rights.201
197. See infra subpart III(B) for further analysis of the extent to which Parratt claims
should be defeated by state remedies which allow suit but not recovery.
198. But see Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Davidson, which concludes that
such a fact pattern could form the basis for a procedural due process claim, without
addressing the effective-remedy issue. 474 U.S. at 348.
One could define the class as all persons instead of all prisoners, and argue that the
nonintervening guard, for example, could be sued if inmates attacked a teacher working
in the prison system. The gravamen of Davidson's suit, however, was that he was caged
by legal compulsion and therefore unable to defend himself. Thus, the similarly situated
persons would be prisoners rather than those merely employed on the premises. See id.
at 350 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that while Daniels might have avoided slipping
on the stairs, Davidson had no recourse except help from the guards).
The facts concerning a federal plaintiff's claim may be critical to assessing the sig-
nificance of an immunity bar. In Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), the re-
moteness of the deprivation from the official negligence prevented the harm from being
state action. Id. at 285. Hence, the federal claim was disposed of without regard to the
immunity statute.
199. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
200. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). Indeed, even the state's provision of a remedy coter-
minous with or greater than the relief available under § 1983, would not affect plaintiff's
procedural right to pursue a federal suit. Whitman, supra note 180, at 22-25.
Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent from certiorari joined by former ChiefJustice Burger
and Justice Blackmun, criticized Monroe's "supplementary remedy," holding and urged
its reconsideration. City of Columbus v. Leonard, 443 U.S. 905, 910-11 (1979) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
201. Accord Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287-96 (1913) (estab-
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Is it critical that Monroe, a fourth amendment case, involved a
more specific constitutional claim than due process? Most of the
Justices have expressed the view that Parratt is applicable only to
procedural due process violations.20 2 The conclusion that Parratt
should not hobble the federal courts in other contexts does not dis-
pose of Monroe's relevance to procedural due process cases like Da-
vidson, where the federal plaintiff's path in state court is already
automatically blocked. °3 It would be anomalous to leave such a
plaintiff with no recourse in any court, given Monroe's instruction
that section 1983 is an additional option to state remedies.
Adoption of this anomaly would also deepen the analytical con-
fusion created by Parratt's use of constitutional concepts to accom-
plish workload redistribution. If the state's offering of paper redress
is the sole basis for the redistribution, the nature of the property
and liberty deprivation becomes irrelevant. Claims against immu-
nized officials would be permanently extinguished whether the dep-
rivation was trivial (guard deliberately takes inmate's sunglasses) or
serious (guard intentionally destroys inmate's valuable legal
papers).204
The Court should have escaped this logical conundrum by
lishing that Congress may enforce fourteenth amendment substantive due process guar-
antees against state officials whether their acts are authorized or unauthorized). By
contrast, Parratt's descendants have found the authorization factor to be critical. Parat
limitations do not apply where conduct is the result of established state procedure rather
than random and unauthorized action. In such instances, no postdeprivation remedy
can satisfy procedural due process. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436
(1982) (cited in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 513, 532 (1984)). In Logan, the Illinois Fair
Employment Practices Commission (the Commission) failed to hold a fact-finding con-
ference within 120 days of the filing of a complaint alleging employment discrimination.
Because the statute governing Commission procedure made such a hearing within the
time period mandatory, the complaint was dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. Logan con-
cluded that although the failure to schedule the conference may have been inadvertent,
the state "system" destroys property interests whenever the Commission does not com-
mence a timely fact-finding conference. 455 U.S. at 436.
202. See infra note 231 and accompanying text, discussing Parratt's relation to substan-
tive due process cases. As to Bill of Rights claims, a federal forum has been accorded.
See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), where the Supreme Court held that the
fourth amendment could apply to a police officer's shooting of an unarmed fleeing sus-
pect, without considering whether state postdeprivation remedies would have been ade-
quate. See also infra notes 208, 230, discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of
"fundamental" rights.
203. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text, discussing the broad immunity
statute that bars relief to a whole class of plaintiffs regardless of their diligence or the
merits of their procedural due process claims.
204. For further discussion of Parratt's application to intentional destruction of legal
documents, see infra note 208 and accompanying text. See also a discussion of liberty and
property deprivations involving institutionalized persons infra at subpart Ill(B).
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framing its analysis as substantive rather than procedural due pro-
cess. Substantive violations arise, among other occasions, when the
state imposes irrational or arbitrary restraints on a citizen's liberty
or property rights.2 °5 Procedural due process, as illustrated by the
very precedents Parratt cited,2 0 6 generally concerns a valid state pur-
pose coupled with the precaution of a hearing to insure that this
goal was properly promoted in the plaintiff's case. Parratt and Hud-
son, by contrast, involved property deprivation that would always be
classified as misconduct. 0 7
The substantive route has the advantage of flexibility. It would
permit the Court to rule that the confiscation of sunglasses is not
unreasonable and arbitrary enough to rise to the level of a constitu-
tional deprivation. Parratt and its descendants have instead chosen
the less adaptable procedural approach. Hudson lumps the signifi-
cant and the trivial loss groups together,20 8 relegated to whatever
level of state relief the Court sanctions. If the mere right to file in a
205. See, e.g., Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 985-86 (1986). Professor Monaghan suggests that Parratt
must have been predicated, at least in part, on substantive due process concerns. If
Parratt's claim had been based only on procedural grounds, the Court would have af-
firmed rather than reversed thejudgment below. See also Redish, supra note 4, at 100-01
(providing examples of illegal behavior that cannot be "purified" by use of proper
procedures).
206. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). The Court, in deciding the
procedural issue of whether certain safeguards should be mandated to reduce the possi-
bility of unwarranted corporal punishment, presumed that school authorities had a right
to paddle students in order to maintain school discipline. Id. at 662-63.
207. The gravamen of these decisions is that the deprivations were unauthorized, and
therefore could not be anticipated or prevented in advance.
208. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 535 (1984). Justice Stevens' dissenting
opinion also noted that Palmer's complaint alleged intentional destruction of legal pa-
pers. Id. at 541 & n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Hossman v. Spradlin, 812 F.2d
1019, 1022-23 (7th Cir. 1987), where the circuit court held, citing Hudson, that a pris-
oner who alleged that prison officials had intentionally destroyed legal papers and law
books had not been deprived of due process because the state provided an adequate
remedy. After acknowledging that cases such as Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977),
enunciated a "fundamental" constitutional right of access to the courts, Hossman held
that "[t]he mere assertion by appellant, in both his response to defendants' motion for
summary judgment and in his brief, that legal papers, transcripts, and law books were
intentionally kept from him fails, without more, to demonstrate a constitutionally signifi-
cant deprivation of meaningful access to the courts." 812 F.2d at 1021-22 (footnote
omitted). To suggest that a pro se prisoner whose legal materials have been taken away
has the burden of proving that these documents were "essential to a pending or contem-
plated appeal" is, to say the least, disingenuous.
In Byrd v. Stewart, 803 F.2d 1168 (11 th Cir. 1986), legal papers and other property
were seized in an unlawful search of plaintiff's home before his arrest. The circuit court
discussed the value of the property at stake, concluding that "the Hudson rationale ap-
plies equally whether the property is valued at $23.50 or $10,000.00." Id. at 1170. The
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state tribunal is sufficient, as Justice Stevens urges, then a section
1983 litigant subjected to intentional and serious loss would en-
counter a further deprivation by ouster from both federal and state
fora.
While the requirement of effective post-injury redress does not
prevent the initial misconduct, a damage award could mitigate or
vitiate the effect of that misconduct. Thus, official arbitrariness is
not compounded. However, when federal courts profess to see a
state remedy where there is none, they are signalling that no post-
deprivation process is due.
B. Fleshing Out Post-Deprivation Process
At the outset of a section 1983 case, a district judge should de-
termine whether automatic barriers or inordinate delay would greet
a claim of deprivation that she deports to a state tribunal. Next, the
adequacy of state compensation levels should be examined. The
Supreme Court has provided no guidance on how to identify inju-
ries that merit a higher recovery than a state provides, and whether
such injuries should be measured against the compensation that
would be available under section 1983.
1. Identification of Cases Presenting Distinct Federal Interests.-His-
torically, section 1983 has not developed in majestic isolation from
state tort law. Civil rights litigation has been influenced both by
constitutional vocabulary, 0 9 and by tort concepts. 2 to This cross-
fertilization process, however, has not led to congruence between
federal and state relief for deprivations of liberty and property. As
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Monroe noted, it would be "the
fact that legal documents had been intentionally and unlawfully taken is noted but not
discussed.
If access to the courts is a "fundamental" right, as the Supreme Court indicated in
several decisions, see, e.g., Bounds, 430 U.S. at 817, 821; Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15
(1971);Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), then Parratt forum limitations should not
apply, making the estimate of state remedies, therefore, irrelevant. See infra note 230 for
further discussion of "fundamental" rights. But see Justice Powell's concurring opinion
in Bounds, setting out his understanding that "where we extended the right of access [to
the courts] .. .to civil rights actions . . . we did not suggest that the Constitution re-
quired such actions to be heard in federal court." 430 U.S. at 833 (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (citations omitted). Some lower courts have held that destruction of legal papers
effects a violation of the right to judicial access and that a federal forum should be avail-
able in such instances. See, e.g., Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1969).
209. See, e.g., Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 GEO. LJ. 1441 passim
(1989).




purest coincidence if the state remedies for violations of common-
law rights by private citizens were fully appropriate to redress those
injuries which only a state official can cause .... ,,2tt
The Supreme Court has indicated that common law rules-and
limitations-may be relevant to section 1983 cases if "the interests
protected by ... [tort law] parallel closely the interests protected by
a particular constitutional right. '21 2 An example of such a parallel
would be a suit on behalf of one accidentally injured by a state offi-
cial speeding in a government vehicle.21 3
The more complex task is defining the circumstances under
which federal interests outrank or diverge from state concerns. Ma-
jor cases such as Parratt and Daniels, which highlighted only trivial
property losses or slip-and-fall negligence, should not be allowed to
obscure the more serious deprivations that can be swept up in the
procedural due process rules that the Court has created. State fail-
ure to remedy deprivation of constitutional rights was a major con-
cern underlying the enactment of section 1983: "Sheriffs, having
eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not .. "2.4
This passage is uncomfortably reminiscent of the prison personnel
who failed to protect Davidson, despite prior warning of the attack
on him, and the state judges who were legislatively barred from
granting Davidson any damages.21 5
The Supreme Court stated in Davidson that due process forbids
"'deprivation' of a protected interest," but does not require "due
care," a torts standard.216 Yet the majority opinion also indicated
that a constitutional violation could occur where prison officials wit-
nessed an assault and permitted it to proceed,2 17 a conclusion that
211. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (Harlan, J., concurring).
212. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258 (1978). The Court held that a student's emo-
tional distress about being suspended from school without due process protections
could be compensable by nominal damages under § 1983. Id. at 263-64. In this in-
stance, however, no compensation was permitted for deprivation of school time because
the student could have been barred even if proper procedures had been observed. Id. at
252.
213. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698 (1976) (expressing a fear that constitu-
tionalizing common law defamation could lead to giving constitutional status to car acci-
dents), reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976).
214. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. at 78 (Mar. 31, 1871).
215. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986), discussed supra notes 191-95 and
accompanying text.
216. 474 U.S. at 348. Accord Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333-36 (1986); Baker
v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 700-01, 712 (holding
that the constitution does not replicate the duty of care under common law).
217. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348.
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appears to incorporate affirmative governmental duties into consti-
tutional prohibitions.
The circumstances under which a constitutional tort might arise
were identified by their absence in DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services.218 DeShaney held that welfare workers had
no affirmative duty to protect a child under their supervision from
his abusive father, and therefore the child was precluded from suing
the welfare workers charged with responsibility for his child-abuse
case.
2 19
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "when the
State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his
will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to as-
sume some responsibility for his safety and well-being. " 22 0 This
duty would arise in prisons22' and in some state mental hospital set-
tings.222 An unauthorized deprivation imposed on a confined indi-
vidual could encompass both substantive and procedural due
process violations.223 The majority offered a "simple" rationale:
the state-imposed restraints on the involuntarily institutionalized
person make him unable to care for himself or act on his own be-
half.224 He must therefore rely on the state to provide for his basic
needs.
To explore the implications of this emphasis on custody, it is
instructive to return to section 1983's central purpose of placing the
federal courts "between the States and the people. '225 When there
218. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
219. Id. at 202. The child's parents were divorced and custody had been awarded to
his father. The § 1983 complaint filed by the child and his mother documented a series
of severe injuries which the county social services authorities were aware of and had
recorded in their files. The abuse culminated in brain injuries that were so severe that
the four-year old boy was confined to an institution for the profoundly retarded. The
father was subsequently convicted of child abuse.
220. Id. at 199-200. This conclusion was linked to substantive due process re-
quirements.
221. Id. at 198-99 n.5 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326-27 (1986) (shooting
of prison inmate)); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239,
244-46 (1983) (government must provide medical care to suspects in police custody
who are injured in the course of an arrest).
222. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-25 (1982) (unconstitutional to
confine an involuntarily committed patient in an institution for the mentally retarded in
unsafe conditions such that the patient may suffer self-inflicted wounds and injuries in-
flicted by other residents).
223. 489 U.S. 189 (citing among other examples the shackling of mental patients in
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316).
224. Id. at 200.
225. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). See supra notes 58-59 and accom-
panying text. See also Nichol, Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REv. 959,
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is misuse of state office, the vast difference between the power of the
individual and that of the governmental actor necessitates a federal
response. The Supreme Court has recognized the fourteenth
amendment's applicability where oppression by the state occurs, 226
but has not linked this to power differentials that are increased in a
situation of involuntary confinement. Disparity of power is com-
pounded when it is manifested before, during, and after the viola-
tion-that is, when an individual is placed under state control,
subjected to unauthorized deprivation by the deliberate act of a
state employee,227 and finally denied adequate state redress. 228
Does the special federal interest in preventing abuse of those in
state custody override Parratt's requirement that procedural due
process cases be deported to state courts if adequate remedies are
provided there? DeShaney, after all, used substantive due process
language in analyzing the rights of mental patients and prisoners to
state protection. 229 Arguably, Parratt's restrictions no longer apply
to suits brought by such claimants. 230 Random and unauthorized
975-76 (1987) (reviewing the historical evidence that members of the 1871 Congress
which enacted § 1983's predecessor were concerned about local judges "who are made
little kings, with almost despotic powers to carry out the partisan demands of the Legis-
lature which elected them ... without regard to law or justice .... ).
226. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986); Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
227. See Wells & Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA.
L. REV. 201 (1984). This pre-Daniels article argues that a § 1983 defendant's reckless-
ness should be sufficient to permit constitutional adjudication and suggests that this
argument is more appropriate where government control over individuals is exercised.
Id. at 242-45. Included as examples of those within such official control are prisoners,
inmates of public institutions, and children stranded in a car on a highway after the
driver was arrested. Id. at 242-44. See White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
228. See Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REv. 225,
272 (1986). In a perceptive article, Professor Whitman discusses "the special problems
created by the massing of power in institutions," id. at 275, suggesting among other
things that in Parratt cases an alternative remedy might be to grant a declaration or
injunction requiring that adequate postdeprivation process be accorded. Id. at 268.
229. See supra subpart III(A), concluding that casting Parratt cases as substantive in-
stead of procedural would be more logical as well as more flexible.
230. The Supreme Court has allowed a federal forum where rights are "fundamen-
tal," for example where a suspect's stomach was pumped to obtain evidence against him.
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169-71 (1952). Unjustified attacks by state officers
themselves should be placed in this unique category as a denial of the confined person's
fundamental rights under Rochin's shock-the-conscience test. Id. at 172. Factual dis-
putes about whether the assaulted person seemed to be threatening the officer could
still blur the legal issue in some instances. For example, in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 316 (1986), a prisoner was shot by prison officers attempting to stop a riot. The
Court applied a substantive due process analysis, but the prisoner lost on the merits. Id.
at 326-28.
Specific Bill of Rights guarantees have also been accorded a federal forum. See
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violations, however, have been resolutely differentiated from other
deprivations.2 3' The majority opinion in DeShaney does not indicate
that all custodial cases must be kept in federal courts.232
Nonetheless, the conclusion that due process claims relating to
involuntarily confined persons involve a federal interest distinct
from common law concerns should significantly affect state ade-
quacy determinations.233 In this category of cases, state redress
should bear a substantial similarity to that available under section
1983.34 Such a standard would require that district courts view the
supra note 202. See Monaghan, supra note 205, at 991-93 (discussing distinctions be-
tween these guarantees and "fundamental" rights).
231. See Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990), where plaintiff in a § 1983 suit
alleged that state officers had deprived him of liberty without due process by admitting
him to a mental hospital as a "voluntary" patient when he was incompetent to give in-
formed consent to this admission. One reason Parvatt was inapplicable was that the dep-
rivation was not unpredictable, and therefore predeprivation procedural safeguards
might have prevented the violation. Id. at 989. Although it is unconstitutional to con-
fine mentally ill persons involuntarily unless they are a danger to themselves or others,
and the violation here was foreseeable, the Court did not decide whether the challenged
conduct would have constituted a substantive due process infringement. Id.. at 987-88,
990. The complaint could have been read to include such a claim, but this issue was not
raised in the petition for certiorari. Id. at 983-84.
While the majority concluded that Parratt limitations do not apply to substantive
due process cases, id. at 983, Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court reaffirmed that
challenges to random and unauthorized violations by state officials will not be granted a
federal forum unless the state fails to provide adequate postdeprivation remedies. Id. at
989-90. Parratt governs such challenges even where liberty is infringed, see supra note
189, and where the official misconduct is deliberate: "In Hudson, the errant employee
himself could anticipate the deprivation since he intended to effect it, but the State still
was not in a position to provide predeprivation process since it could not anticipate or
control such random and unauthorized intentional conduct." 110 S. Ct. at 989 (citing
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533-34 (1984)).
The Court reasoned that in Burch, the state had delegated to mental hospital em-
ployees the authority both to confine patients and to "initiate the procedural safeguards
set up by state law to guard against unlawful confinement." 110 S. Ct. at 990. Such
safeguards included a judicial hearing which was to precede any involuntary admission
lasting more than five days. Id. at 981-82. Parratt and Hudson were differentiated be-
cause in those cases, officials were not given delegated authority to cause deprivations or
to decide whether pre-deprivation process would be accorded. Id. at 990. Thus, the
majority refused to equate the Hudson guard's power to destroy an inmate's property
with the Burch staff's power to grant or deny a hearing, although both powers may be
wrongfully exercised.
232. DeShaney cites with approval Davidson and Daniels, opinions issued after the cus-
tody decisions DeShaney discusses. 489 U.S. at 196; see supra notes 188-98 and accompa-
nying text (analyzing Davidson and Daniels).
233. The fact that this conclusion arises from a substantive due process analysis em-
phasizes the error in Parratt's approach to misconduct that is unlawful regardless of the
procedures attached to it. See supra subpart III(A).
234. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. See also Note, Parratt and Taylor Revis-
ited: Defining the Adequate Remedy Requirement, 65 B.U.L. REV. 607, 634 & n.185 (1985)
(suggesting that noncompensatory features such as attorneys' fees may not be essential
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state remedy realistically,2"' rather than assuming that any tort ana-
logue provides effective relief.236 However, the section 1983 plain-
tiffs would retain the burden of proof as to all aspects of their
claims, 23 7 including lack of substantial similarity between federal
and state redress.
2. Application of the Substantial-Similarity Standard.-The pro-
posed substantial-similarity requirement would be flexible enough
to make distinctions based on the seriousness of the misconduct.
Prison assaults by one inmate against another can result in severe
injuries if, despite prior warnings, guards do nothing to avert the
attack. 3 8 Inmates are dependent on official protection because they
are not permitted to fight, even in self-defense. Property crimes can
also do significant harm. In our prior example, a mental patient's
legal documents are intentionally destroyed in an action unrelated
to confiscation of contraband. 3 9 The state fails to provide a suffi-
cient post-deprivation remedy with the result that ruined affidavits
from overseas witnesses cannot be satisfactorily reconstructed. 4 °
By contrast, some deprivations may have little impact. Pre-
elements of an adequate state remedy; however, formal remedies coupled with "signifi-
cant obstacles" like state immunity provisions would be inadequate).
235. In the adequate-state-grounds context, the Supreme Court has set aside self-
serving arguments by states and examined local provisions with care. See supra Part I.
Lower courts have varied dramatically in their handling of adequacy determinations in
constitutional torts cases. See infra subpart III(C).
236. See infra note 371, discussing state-to-state variation in the effectiveness of sur-
vival statutes designed to compensate the families of wrongful-death victims for lost fi-
nancial support. See also Note, supra note 234, at 645 nn.234-40 and accompanying text
(pointing out possible deficiencies in recoveries under state survival and wrongful death
statutes).
237. See infra note 377 and accompanying text. A plaintiff need not exhaust adminis-
trative remedies. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 500-16 (1982) (holding
that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to an action under
§ 1983). See also supra note 68, and infra note 307 (discussing Patsy). The mini-exhaus-
tion requirement potentially applicable to prisoners who bring § 1983 suits has had little
impact. See infra note 307.
238. For example, in Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 349 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), plaintiff "suffered stab wounds on his face and body as well as a broken
nose that required surgery."
Professor Abernathy persuasively argues that the courts must develop guidelines
for standards of care in incarceration settings. Abernathy, supra note 209, at 1483-88.
Such standards become more complex where the guard himself has not engaged in the
harassment or assault, but has deliberately permitted it to occur. Id. at 1486-87.
239. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
240. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 535-37 (1984), which relegated the plaintiff,
a prisoner, to vaguely described redress in the state courts after his legal materials and
other property were intentionally destroyed. See supra note 208 and accompanying text
(discussing circuit court treatment of such cases).
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sume, for example, that a prisoner's hobby kit is intentionally stolen
by prison personnel and then thrown away. Neither section 1983
nor the state provision need do more than make the inmate whole
for the loss; the equivalent of a small-claims procedure in state court
would be sufficient. However, the mere right to file suit against de-
fendants who are immunized in state court would be inadequate per
se. Recompense should be available, if only to underline the gov-
ernment actor's duty to refrain from harassing inmates and to en-
courage prison management to reduce such incidents. 4 '
In noncustodial situations, state common law or statutory reme-
dies that provide more than nominal redress are generally appropri-
ate. Caution is dictated by the subordinating effect of constitutional
rulings on tort systems that are appropriately responsive to local
conditions and resources. Because such a ruling could not be al-
tered by state law, 242 a requirement of approximation between state
and federal redress should not routinely be imposed.243
In the class of cases governed by the substantial-similarity stan-
dard, should a balancing process assigning some weight to the
241. Cf. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 528, where the Court, in the context of rejecting plain-
tiff's fourth amendment claim of an unreasonable search and seizure of his property,
stated that "of course, intentional harassment of even the most hardened criminals can-
not be tolerated by a civilized society." Under certain circumstances, harassment could
rise to the level of an eighth amendment cruel-and-unusual-punishment violation. Id. at
530. See also Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO.
L.J. 1719, 1740 & n.128 (1989).
Note that if Parratt had adopted a substantive due process standard rather than a
procedural approach, federal jurisdiction for cases involving trivial property thefts might
well be unavailable, since the pivotal issue would be the nature of the injury rather than
the adequacy of the state remedy. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284 (1980). See also Whitman, supra
note 180, at 5, 30-40 (discussing state interests in controlling the development of tort
law).
243. There may be classes of cases where the power disparity between individual and
government employee is slight, and therefore no special federal interest is implicated.
For example, a fire fighter employed by a municipality gains access to a house because
he is responding to a blaze on the first floor. After extinguishing the fire, he pockets an
art object as he leaves. Such a random and unauthorized act, a tort under common law,
could be remedied by state processes that are more limited than those afforded under
§ 1983.
Moreover, caseload considerations cannot be discounted, even though the poten-
tial torrent of constitutional tort litigation has been significantly reduced by exclusion of
negligent acts from federal review. See supra subpart III(A) (discussion of Daniels and
Davidson). Artful pleading could, of course, be used to transform negligence into inten-
tion, but summary judgment might well dispose of many of such attempts. For example,
no evidence would support the claim that Taylor's hobby kit was intentionally rather
than carelessly misplaced. In light of the federal docket's bulk, state procedures that
offer more than nominal redress may be preferable to federal monitoring of concerns
that differ little from those pertinent to a controversy between private citizens.
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state's interest be mandated under the calculus developed in Ma-
thews v. Eldridge?24 The Mathews standard, which emerged in the
context of a request for a hearing prior to termination of social se-
curity benefits, pitted plaintiff's private interest against the govern-
ment's stake in not providing further procedural safeguards.245
Mathews assessed a state policy of withholding pre-deprivation
process.246 It could therefore be distinguished from cases such as
Parratt, which concern post-deprivation relief for random and unau-
thorized conduct. In the former situation, the state has an interest
in a particular method of implementing an official rule. Moreover,
denial of a prior hearing would not preclude judicial consideration
after the injury.
Conversely, in Parratt and Hudson, an acknowledged violation of
state law was ripe for redress. Because there is no state interest in
official misconduct, any weighing process would match plaintiff's
property or liberty rights against the state's decision to supply inad-
equate recompense for such misconduct. Even if Mathews were rele-
vant to all procedural disputes, its balancing test would not be
satisfied by illusory or insubstantial relief premised on state conven-
ience. Procedural due process is not a mere manifestation of effi-
ciency.2 47 Nor do immunities, even those rooted in common law,
necessarily restrict the ambit of section 1983.248 Post-deprivation
244. 424 U.S. 319, 335-49 (1976). Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct. 975, 985 (1990),
characterized Parratt and Hudson as "a special case of the general Mathews... analysis"
because no pre-deprivation process was possible in such cases. The Court did not ex-
plore the question of how the Mathews criteria would apply in assessing the adequacy of
postdeprivation remedies. Parratt merely noted that its analysis was "quite consistent"
with the approach taken in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977), which cited
the Mathews balancing test. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542 (1981); see also Dan-
iels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 331, 335 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
533 n.14 (1984); see infra note 250 discussing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
245. The Mathews balancing test requires consideration of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute pro-
cedural requirement would entail.
424 U.S. at 335.
246. 424 U.S. at 323. But cf. supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussion of
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)).
247. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972). See also Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565, 580 (1975) (noting that procedural safeguards should be provided if the cost is
not "prohibitive").
248. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974). Cf. Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (concluding that the same considerations of public policy that
underlie the common-law rule of immunity likewise apply to § 1983 immunity). See infra
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process analyses such as that constructed in Ingraham v. Wright249
have regarded common-law remedies as possible substitutes for fed-
eral aid, but only where such redress is "fully adequate" to insure
due process.25 °
An appropriate balance has already been incorporated into the
proposed standard, which excludes noncustodial situations from its
ambit. Classes of cases where the official actor does not have total
authority over the private individual would not be subject to the
substantial-similarity requirement. Thus, the Mathews layer would
allow a double counting of state interests.
Hudson's "meaningful" redress requirement 25 ' was addressed
to all constitutional tort litigation. It is particularly significant where
distinct federal concerns are implicated-as in a section 1983 suit in
which compulsory confinement facilitates unremediable miscon-
duct. Plaintiff in such suits must not only have access to a state hear-
ing that engenders fair fact-finding, 25 2 but must also have relief
consonant with the magnitude of the injury.253
C. Lower Court Interpretations of Procedures Adequate
to Satisfy Due Process
The mixed signals sent by the Supreme Court on what consti-
tutes an adequate remedy are well illustrated by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County.254 It was undisputed
that state law immunized all the defendants from liability. 255 Facing
subpart III(C) for a discussion of lower court confusion over immunity issues in Parratt
cases.
249. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
250. Id. at 672. A central issue in Ingraham was whether school authorities who ad-
ministered severe corporal punishment to junior high school students without notice or
hearing violated due process guarantees. The Supreme Court concluded that there was
no such violation because the student would have the right under common law, as re-
flected in a state statute, to receive a damage award after the paddling if the punishment
was excessive. Id. at 675-76, 677 n.45.
251. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
252. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344-45 (1976).
253. See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
254. 764 F.2d 1451 (11 th Cir. 1985). In Rittenhouse, plaintiff brought a § 1983 action
against a county water and sewer authority and a county official, claiming that defendant
had failed to repair a leaking pipe after being warned of the hazardous conditions sur-
rounding the water flow. Id. at 1452-53. The leaking water froze during the night after
the call, creating an ice slick on a roadway which contributed to an automobile accident
that killed plaintiff's child. Id. at 1452. Rittenhouse pre-dated the Supreme Court's ruling
in Daniels, and therefore the county's negligence was still a valid basis for applying Par-
ratt standards. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
255. 764 F.2d at 1457. The county was immune by statute from negligence liability.
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"conflicting indications in Supreme Court authority" '256  as to
whether such immunity vitiates a claim that post-deprivation process
is really available, the circuit court proceeded to draw up a score
sheet. Inferences drawn from Parratt and Hudson were balanced
against dicta from other opinions.25 7 At the end of this exercise, the
court concluded that any doubts about the appropriateness of im-
munity barriers were to be resolved in the state's favor if the defen-
sive provisions were traditional or not "irrational." ' Under this
standard, the section 1983 plaintiff's deprivation of property (or lib-
erty) could give rise to a right with merely a paper remedy.
Automatic federal deference to an uncertain or fruitless state
procedure has appeared in diverse contexts. For example, one suit
filed by a plaintiff whose property was seized by New Hampshire
state officers and not returned despite court orders directing resto-
ration, was dismissed because several years of delay did not consti-
tute a deprivation; the state had "not yet refused" to provide a
remedy.259 The court made no attempt to analyze or justify the
The official who was a named defendant was immune under Georgia common law. 764
F.2d at 1457.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1457-59. Parratt sought an actual remedy, from which it could be inferred
that the lack of such a remedy might have supported federal jurisdiction. Justice Pow-
ell's concurrence explicitly concluded that immunity which cuts off all state remedies
would effect a deprivation of procedural due process. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
551 n.9 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). Similarly, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 535-
36 (1984), held that state procedures were adequate only after concluding that state law
accorded no immunity to defendants.
On the other hand, a pre-Parratt opinion had held that although an immunity stat-
ute that blocked a wrongful death action might be a "deprivation," the state could fash-
ion its own tort rules without constitutional restriction unless its provision was "wholly
arbitrary or irrational." Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 282-83 (1980). Although
only state law questions were at issue in Martinez, its reasoning was used in Rittenhouse to
bless traditional governmental immunities. 764 F.2d at 1458. Further encouragement
for this view was found in the post-Parratt decision in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982), which granted federal jurisdiction to plaintiff but noted in
dictum that the state could validly create substantive defenses or immunities. See supra
note 201.
258. Rittenhouse, 764 F.2d at 1458. Cf. Ausley v. Mitchell, 748 F.2d 224, 227-29 (4th
Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Winter, J., concurring in part) (asserting that uncertainty of state
law regarding the availability of sovereign immunity cast doubt on whether state reme-
dies were adequate). See also Waterstraat v. Central State Hosp., 533 F. Supp. 274, 276
(W.D. Va. 1982), where the court found that individual state employee defendants were
subject to tort suit and therefore state remedies were adequate even though the state
claimed sovereign immunity as an entity.
259. Decker v. Hillsborough County Attorney's Office, 845 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1988)
(per curiam). Police, acting under allegedly questionable search warrants, searched
plaintiff's residence and seized personal property, only a small part of which was used at
his state criminal proceeding. Id. at 19. After trial, plaintiff filed a motion for return of
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state's interest in spinning out the time during which plaintiff was
deprived of the use of his property. Yet the Supreme Court in pre-
Parralt cases required such an analysis to determine whether exces-
sive delay rises to the level of a denial of due process.2
Federal circuit judges have also displayed exaggerated defer-
ence to state tribunals in the face of charges of bias and impropriety
on the part of a trial judge. Texas oil company owners contended
that a state judge arranged to have a suit against them brought
before his court contrary to the usual procedure for assigning cases
and that he imposed receiverships on their assets in direct defiance
of higher court orders.26' Their section 1983 suit was rejected on
the grounds that the right to a fair trial is a matter of procedural
rather than substantive due process, and that recourse to appellate
tribunals that dismissed their case on procedural grounds had pro-
vided adequate post-deprivation remedies.262 This conclusion
his legal, noncontraband property. However, the trial judge, during a hearing at which
plaintiff was not present, ordered a part of the property destroyed and the remaining
property returned to plaintiff. Despite repeated efforts by plaintiff to obtain the seized
objects, none of the property was returned. Plaintiff brought a § 1983 action in federal
court asserting due process claims, but these claims were dismissed. The First Circuit
affirmed, holding that plaintiff was pursuing existing post-deprivation state remedies for
the return of his property. The court also ruled that the "flagrant disobedience" of an
earlier state court order to return this property did not deprive plaintiff of due process
despite a delay of over three years, because it was "not apparent that plaintiff cannot
ultimately achieve some effective relief.., in the state court system." Id. at 22.
260. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985) (nine-
month delay was not excessive where it was caused in part by the thoroughness of proce-
dures); United States v. $8,850 in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 564 (1983) (18-
month delay before the filing of a postseizure forfeiture hearing was deemed not exces-
sive after balancing the reasons for the time gap against prejudice to claimant); Barry v.
Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979) (due process was violated where a horse trainer's license
was suspended without prompt hearing). Cf. Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 470 U.S.
1018, 1022-23 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (procedures
were inadequate when they did not provide for recovery of damages for a one-year delay
in providing welfare benefits).
261. Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d 1287, 1289 (5th Cir. 1986).
262. Id. at 1292-94. Plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action against the judge and other
parties alleging a conspiracy resulting in deprivation of due process rights. They subse-
quently perfected their appeal of the state court action but did not post a supersedeas
bond to stay execution of the state judgment. Id. at 1290. Their appeal was denied by
the the state's intermediate appellate court. Humble Exploration Co. v. Browning, 690
S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (en banc), reinstating 677 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984). The federal district court subsequently granted summary judgment to defend-
ants on plaintiff's § 1983 action. 784 F.2d at 1290.
More often, however, the federal court merely mentions that the state provides an
adequate remedy, without the slightest analysis. See, e.g., Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143,
147-48 (3rd Cir. 1985) (prisoner alleged that officials gave certain inmates keys to cell
doors; plaintiff's fear of assault was cognizable under the eighth amendment but his
fourteenth amendment claim concerning theft of his property would not be heard under
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strangely blurs the distinction between fundamental and nonfunda-
mental rights. 263
There are further implications of such decisions. Suppose the
federal plaintiff had dutifully pursued state "remedies," only to find
that the available procedures afforded no opportunity to reclaim
property taken by state officials without authority. If the federal
court decides that plaintiff should have realized the futility of this
journey through state tribunals, he may be faced with a ruling that
claim preclusion 2 1 blocks access to federal relief.265 This approach
§ 1983); Hossman v. Spradlin, 812 F.2d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (no due
process violation because the state remedy was adequate), see supra note 208 (further
discussion); Wilson v. Town of Clayton, 839 F.2d 375, 383 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting a
challenge to the adequacy of the statute at issue in Hossman and merely citing Hossman's
mention of adequacy as dispositive). Compare the sophisticated and thorough dissent of
Judge Norris in Punton v. City of Seattle, 805 F.2d 1378, 1383-86 (9th Cir. 1986) (Nor-
ris, J. dissenting):
[W]hile the majority recognizes it must consider ... whether the state's post-
deprivation process is fully 'adequate' to satisfy due process requirements...
the majority never engages in such an analysis. A federal court must do far
more than offhandedly assert that 'a remedy ... colorably satisfies due process,'
... to ensure that a state postdeprivation remedy is truly adequate before in-
voking Parratt v. Taylor... to bar a § 1983 action.
Id. at 1384 n.2 (emphasis added by Judge Norris). See infra note 266 (further discussion
of Punton).
263. See supra notes 208, 231. See also Monaghan, supra note 205, at 991 n.83.
264. Claim preclusion includes the doctrine of merger, which holds that if a plaintiff
obtains a final judgment in his favor, his claim is extinguished, merged in the judgment
and therefore cannot be relitigated. Thejudgment is substituted for the claim. F. JAMES
& G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 11.3, 11.7 (3d ed. 1985). Similarly, if plaintiff loses
in his action, his claim is extinguished. The doctrine of bar, which is also included in
claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same claim. Id. In either case, the winner
may successfully plead res judicata. Where only the theory of recovery differs, a second
action by plaintiff against the same defendant on the same facts will generally be pre-
cluded by the courts. See, e.g., Harrington v. Vandalia-Buder Bd. of Educ., 649 F.2d 434,
438-39 (6th Cir. 1981); Roach v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, 595 F.2d 446, 450-51
(8th Cir. 1979); Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 470 (3rd Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951).
See also Redish, supra note 4, at 107, discussing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105
(1980), in which the Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel-the binding
effect of litigating an issue in a previous cause of action-barred relitigation of claims
that might have been brought in an earlier case arising out of the same facts. Professor
Redish notes: "Since it is well established that state and federal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction over section 1983 suits, a failure to raise a section 1983 claim in the course
of the state judicial action would bar a subsequent federal suit." Redish, supra note 4, at
107.
265. See Flores v. Edinburg Consol. Indep. School Dist., 741 F.2d 773, 777-79 (5th
Cir. 1984). Plaintiff suffered injury in an accident in a high school woodworking class,
and sued the teacher and the school district in state court. The court granted summary
judgment to defendants based on sovereign immunity under Texas law. Plaintiff subse-
quently brought a § 1983 action in federal court, which rejected the resjudicata defense
asserted by defendants and entered judgment for plaintiff. The Fifth Circuit reversed,
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invites more rather than less traffic to the federal gates, although
initial resort to section 1983 risks dismissal-which may also occur
after the statute of limitations on the state claim has lapsed. If plain-
tiff attempts to litigate in both federal and state courts in order to
get the combined relief necessary to make him whole, he may be
held to have made an "election" which precludes him from aban-
doning a state remedy that "colorably" satisfies due process. 2
Although some courts unwisely presume adequacy, or create
no-win situations for litigants, other judges have been rigorous in
examining state remedies. Consider, for example, Parrett v. City of
Connersville,267 where a police officer who had been constructively
discharged was required to use a grievance procedure which did not
accord full due process. Judge Posner's opinion for the circuit court
thoroughly analyzed the limitations imposed in the course of the
state procedure, concluding:
This is not to say that arbitration cannot satisfy the require-
ments of due process unless the arbitrator is empowered to
ruling that plaintiff should have added the § 1983 claim to his state court action and
that, in the absence of different facts and measure of recovery, a different theory of
recovery was insufficient to override the res judicata affirmative defense. Id. at 777.
266. See Punton v. City of Seattle, 805 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1986). An officer
dismissed from the police force for infraction of departmental rules without being ad-
vised of charges or afforded a hearing prior to dismissal, appealed to the Public Safety
Civil Service Commission. The Commission held that its jurisdiction did not include
constitutional due process issues and affirmed. Id. at 1379. Plaintiff subsequently ap-
pealed to a state trial court which ordered reinstatement with back pay and attorney's
fees. The Washington intermediate appellate court subsequently held that the award of
attorney's fees was beyond the state court's jurisdiction. Punton v. City of Seattle Pub.
Safety Comm'n, 32 Wash. App. 959, 970, 650 P.2d 1138, 1144 (1982). Plaintiff had
meanwhile filed a federal action, seeking damages under § 1983 which had not been
pleaded or received in state court. Once the state trial court judgment was granted,
plaintiff sought to prevent the city from relitigating liability issues under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. The city claimed that the federal action was barred because plaintiff
had already received all appropriate relief in state court. The federal jury found for
plaintiff and the city appealed. 805 F.2d at 1380.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, indicating that plaintiff had tried to set up offensive
collateral estoppel for claims under § 1983, id. at 1381-82, and that plaintiff may not
abandon a state remedy that substantially compensates him "merely because litigation
strategy and ... a more adequate award" make a federal action more attractive. Id. at
1383.
The dissent concluded that the state remedy was not adequate because the state
was precluded under state law from assessing all of plaintiff's damages and could not
award the relief sought in federal court. Id. at 1385 (Norris, J., dissenting). The dissent
declared that "[u]nder the majority's analysis litigants could never bring a § 1983 action
in federal court unless they first had asserted the same action in state court. This, of
course, is not the law. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982)." 805 F.2d at
1384 n.2 (parallel citations omitted).
267. 737 F.2d 690 (7th Cir. 1984).
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award full common law damages. But if he cannot, then he
must be able to prevent the harm to the grievant before it
occurs, which requires faster action than was taken by the
arbitrator in this case. 2o
Other courts have scrutinized a state's case law as well as its statutes
to ensure that a remedy for a section 1983 plaintiff would in fact be
accorded.26 9
To what extent has the approach in Deakins v. Monaghan,270 re-
quiring a federal "wait and see" response to an uncertain state rem-
edy,27' been reflected in the Parratt area? Concern about remedies
that give only part of what the federal plaintiff requests has been
evidenced in some procedural due process cases.272 A few courts
have also held that a section 1983 action should be "dismissed with-
out prejudice and in the event that the state court ...[does not
accord an apparent remedy], plaintiff may petition to re-open [that]
claim. "273 These are additional lower court options that offer
268. Id. at 697. Plaintiff was the town's chief of detectives. He had investigated the
daughter of a man who subsequently was appointed city attorney. Plaintiff was pres-
sured by the city attorney to resign, but when he refused, the city attorney arranged a
change of duty imposing enforced idleness, which led plaintiff to illness and retirement.
Id. at 692-93. Plaintiff argued that this constituted constructive discharge and that he
was deprived of property without due process. The court agreed, finding that the en-
forced idleness was humiliating for an "ambitious professional"; "depreciated plaintiff's
professional skills," making it difficult for him to resume his career effectively elsewhere;
and the position was "intolerable" for a person "with some self respect." Id. at 694.
269. See, e.g., the opinion of Chief Judge Cummings and the concurrence of Judge
Easterbrook in Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1404, 1409 (7th Cir. 1985) (actions
for recovery of personal property, unlawful withholding or conversion of that property,
or trespass constitute acceptable state remedies; defendants not immune under state law
and the existence of adequate state remedies counters plaintiff's fourteenth amendment
allegations); Williams v. St. Louis County, 812 F.2d 1079, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 1987) (state
court's lack of a basis for its denial of plaintiff's in forma pauperis status created a con-
stitutional issue and rendered an otherwise adequate state post-deprivation remedy in-
adequate); Drogan v. Ward, 675 F. Supp. 832, 836-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (a pending
delayed state proceeding had deprived plaintiff of a property interest, but the depriva-
tion was not reviewable in state courts).
270. 484 U.S. 193 (1988).
271. Deakins, an abstention case, is discussed in detail supra subpart II(C).
272. See, e.g., Parrett v. City of Connersville, 737 F.2d at 697; Bumgarner v. Blood-
worth, 738 F.2d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (inadequacy was found in a state
remedy according damages but no specific relief for unlawful seizure of property that
had sentimental value); Rutherford v. United States, 702 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1983)
(compensation for mental anguish cannot be awarded under a state procedure for recov-
ery of excess taxes; the procedure is therefore inadequate). But see supra subpart III(A)
(discussing statements in Parratt and its descendants that relief in the state courts need
not be as complete as would be available under § 1983).
273. Reich v. Beharry, 686 F. Supp. 533, 534 (W.D. Pa. 1988). In Reich, plaintiff had
been engaged as a special prosecutor in the criminal prosecution of defendant, the
County Controller. After the jury found defendant not guilty of the charges, the defend-
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heightened scrutiny of state law while synthesizing the interests of
the federal judiciary, the states, and the section 1983 litigant.
IV. JUDICIAL RATIONALES FOR TREATMENT OF AMBIGUITIES OR
OBSTACLES IN STATE LAW
In each jurisdictional area that this Article has examined, a fed-
eral tribunal asked to adjudicate a federal claim considers the possi-
bility of restricting the litigant to a state determination instead.
Such consideration can entail a serious analysis of the state forum
or, conversely, involve little more than the brief ritual of asserting
that this alternate forum is adequate. These discordant approaches
stem from separate lines of Supreme Court cases.
One might postulate that different contexts justify different
levels of scrutiny. To test this proposition, it is instructive to com-
pare the rationales that have propped up disparate judicial choices.
Phrases that routinely recur in federal court opinions concerning
the adequacy of state processes are "efficiency," "equity," ".avoiding
disruption" and "fostering federalism and comity." While these
terms have a persuasive ring, they ultimately fail to justify inconsis-
tent versions of adequacy.
A. Elwency and Overload: The Understated and Unstated Rationales
Efficiency and overload considerations substantially affect
Supreme Court treatment of ambiguous state law. On one level,
efficiency means assuring a hearing for federal claims with a mini-
mum of unnecessary effort. 7 4 On another level, it may be efficient
to handle adequacy determinations by making assumptions rather
than by making inquiries. The latter brand of efficiency is directly
related to the problem of federal court overload, which is eased
when a case is deported-on any rationale--to a state tribunal.
ant repeatedly refused to issue payment of bills for plaintiff's services. Plaintiff then
brought a § 1983 suit against both the County and the Controller, asserting deprivation
of a property interest without due process and pendent state claims. The district court,
citing Parratt, held that plaintiff was required to pursue available state remedies. Id. at
534-35. See also, e.g., Loftin v. Thomas, 681 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1982). In Loftin, a pris-
oner claimed that a deputy sheriff took his personal clothing while in custody, and that
the loss constituted negligent deprivation of his property without due process of law.
The court of appeals found that an adequate state remedy existed but held that should
plaintiff's claim be denied for any reason but lack of merit, he might again seek § 1983
relief. Id. at 365. Loftin was cited with approval in Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381,
383 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983).
274. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01
(1941), discussed supra section II(A)(2).
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1. Justifiable Efficiency.-The only recourse for a civil litigant
whose federal claim is procedurally barred in the state courts is
United States Supreme Court review.2 75 HathoM v. Lovorn 276 and its
predecessors stressed that a state procedural ground that is not
"strictly or regularly followed" cannot preclude such review.27 7 In
applying this standard, Hathorn carefully scrutinized prior state
opinions, with special emphasis on recent precedents. s
It might be argued that the Supreme Court's exacting method-
ology in such adequate-state-grounds decisions is dictated by the fi-
nality of the litigation stage that has been reached. It is efficient to
exercise the power to examine inconsistent state law at the last mo-
ment that federal rights can be preserved. Federal district court ju-
risdiction invoked before a state proceeding has concluded is
distinguishable and can entail a different level of scrutiny.
This argument contains critical flaws. Federal intervention in a
pending state proceeding can be sought at the trial or post-trial
stage.27 9 In the constitutional tort context, relief in the district
court has been requested before a state action commenced, 8 ° after
years of state litigation2 8 ' or after a state ruling.2 82 These factually
variegated section 1983 situations now have an element in common:
Supreme Court consideration would only be available by certiorari
discretion.283 In the Pennzoil and Parratt areas, the federal district
court that dismisses the plaintiff generally will be the last federal
stop in all but a tiny percentage of cases in which a subsequent state
275. See supra subpart I(A). Defendants in criminal cases, who have failed to obtain
certiorari review of a state court conviction, could still seek habeas corpus in a federal
district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
276. 457 U.S. 255 (1982), discussed supra Part I.
277. Id. at 262-63 (citing with approval Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149
(1964)).
278. Id. at 263-65.
279. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 39 (1971), discussed supra section
II(A)(1) (injunction sought against a pending prosecution); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
481 U.S. 1, 6 (1987), discussed supra subpart II(B) (intervention was sought after the
conclusion of trial).
280. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 520 (1984).
281. See, e.g., Decker v. Hillsborough County Attorney's Office, 845 F.2d 17, 19-20
(1st Cir. 1988) (per curiam), discussed supra note 259.
282. See, e.g., Flores v. Edinburg Consol. Indep. School Dist., 741 F.2d 773, 777-79
(5th Cir. 1984), discussed supra note 265.
283. In 1988, the Supreme Court's appeals jurisdiction was virtually eliminated. See
Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Star. 662 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (1982)
and related sections). See supra note 19. The effect of the amendment was, among
others, to preclude the mandatory appeals jurisdiction that had previously been avail-
able where: (1) a state court held a state law valid against a federal claim; and (2) where
a federal court held a state statute unconstitutional.
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determination is reviewed by certiorari.2 8s Thus, the parallel to the
last-chance Hathorn litigation stage becomes more apparent.
Yet a difference between Hathorn and the other areas must be
taken into account. In the adequate-state-grounds decisions, there
is no need to speculate about what the state will do because the pro-
cedural barrier has been acknowledged and the record is closed.
On the other hand, in cases similar to Pennzoil and Parratt, the dis-
trict court must generally make a prediction about whether the state
forum will be receptive to the federal questions-and a hard-to-re-
but presumption of receptivity takes less time than inquiry.
Nonetheless, a judicial decision based on a realistic look at the
adequacy of state processes assures a hearing for section 1983 issues
in some court system, and therefore such scrutiny should be used in
all last-federal-stop situations. The contextual differences could be
reflected by modifying rather than rejecting the Hathorn approach.
The burden of digesting state law and practice can be placed on the
section 1983 plaintiff, who must rebut an initial presumption that
the state will fairly determine the federal claims. 2 ' A demonstra-
tion that these claims will probably not be given a hearing on the
merits or effective redress by state tribunals would satisfy this
burden.
Such careful methodology is not essential when the federal dis-
trict court makes no immediate determination, but retains control
over the ultimate outcome of the litigation. Justifiable efficiency
permits a no-waste approach, protecting the litigant with a mini-
mum of effort. One federal doctrine implementing that approach is
Pullman/England abstention,"8 6 which requires state court clarifica-
tion of a potentially unconstitutional state statute. The benefit of
abstention is that the constitutional defect may in some cases be ob-
viated. Nonetheless, a plaintiff can exercise the option of re-enter-
ing the federal gates with a constitutional challenge to the newly
interpreted law. The possible gain of time for the district court
judge imposes costs on the plaintiff, 87 but does not extinguish the
claim.
284. Circuit court reversal or certiorari review of the federal district court's abstention
decision would be rare, especially in view of the present Pennzoil and Parratt approaches.
See supra subparts II(B) and III(A). But f. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193 (1988),
discussed supra subpart II(C) (Court reviewed lower court nonintervention decisions in
order to set guidelines for handling damage requests relating to pending prosecutions).
285. This less time-consuming but realistic scrutiny is discussed in detail, infra Part V.
286. See supra section II(A)(2).
287. See, e.g., A.L.I., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OFJURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FED-
ERAL COURTS 48-50, 282-87 (1969).
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A "wait and see" approach was carefully crafted in Deakins v.
Monaghan"'s where the section 1983 plaintiffs were defendants in a
state prosecution. They sought damages against state officials for
an allegedly unconstitutional search. Justice Blackmun, writing for
the Court, pointed out that plaintiffs' monetary claims could not be
heard in the criminal case, but could be eligible for state considera-
tion in a separate suit.2 s 9 As we have seen, dismissal of the damage
claim was not warranted because plaintiffs' state remedy might be
unsatisfactory. Nor was immediate disposition of the merits author-
ized, because a federal pronouncement could have a res judicata im-
pact on the pending prosecution. The district court was directed to
retain jurisdiction only to insure that the federal claims received an
appropriate state hearing.290
2. Lessening Overload.-Prudential doctrines fashioned by the
Supreme Court, centering on procedural requirements such as
standing, have restricted access to the federal judiciary.29 ' Occa-
sionally, one of the Justices has acknowledged that these technical
doctrines accompanied by elaborate justifications have been fueled
by the purpose of relieving busy judges of their workload. 92
Until recendy, the Supreme Court itself has experienced such a
288. 484 U.S. 193 (1988), analyzed supra subpart II(C). See infra Part V (discussing
retention of jurisdiction as a methodology preferable to dismissal in cases where state
remedies are uncertain).
289. 484 U.S. at 204.
290. Id.
291. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 512-14 (1975) (plaintiffs representing a
wide variety of allegedly injured parties including minority groups, taxpayers, builders,
and tenants, had no standing to challenge town zoning policies).
292. See, e.g., former ChiefJustice Burger's dissenting opinion in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 522-23 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Fiss, supra note 4, at
1140; Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in the Doctrine of Equitable Restraint: A Critical Analy-
sis, 1976 DUKE L.J. 523, 566. Cf. Fiss, supra note 4, at 1160, suggesting that the Supreme
Court has used jurisdictional doctrines such as federalism as tools to curb idealistic
judges. Commenting on this theme, Professor Redish notes that if such doctrines are
simply veiled attempts to curb district court protection of civil rights, "any analysis that
takes the Court at its word might be guilty of the grossest naivete." Redish, The Doctrine
of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 466 n.15
(1978). He adds that there may, however, be value in explaining the court's actual pur-
pose. Id. See also Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to
Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 53 n.18 (1989) (concluding that the hostility of some
Justices to § 1983 has been thinly disguised by undeveloped policy formulations);
Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
2179, 2181 (1989) (expressing concern that, in the context of suggested revision of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "otherwise legitimate efficiency-based arguments are
being pressed into the service of a political agenda hostile to the substantive rights of
certain classes of federal litigants." (emphasis in original)).
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burgeoning docket 293 that intricate schemes have been proposed to
create a new federal court that would handle the excess filings, 2 4
and more modest proposals have been enacted to reduce the
number of cases eligible for review. 295
It would, therefore, have been expedient for the high Court to
approve self-assessments by state tribunals that proffer adequate
state grounds and deny inconsistency with prior precedents. This
approval would signal to similarly situated litigants that certiorari
application would be futile. Particularly egregious cases, where cyn-
ically erected "springes" have insulted the Court's intelligence, 29
could still be considered.
The Justices have not adopted such a restrictive posture. One
possible reason for their use of the more realistic Hathorn standard
is that rejecting the adequacy of state grounds results in more work
for the state judiciary, but not for the federal district courts. Yet,
this standard requires careful scrutiny, permits repeated return of
cases to the Supreme Court, 9 7 and may encourage more certiorari
candidates. The Hathorn standard is not the most expeditious way
of guarding the federal portals, but it is an efficient method of pre-
serving federal rights.
At the district court level, caseload concerns arise from an ex-
293. The Supreme Court appears to be limiting significantly the number of certiorari
candidates it is accepting and, on November 27, 1989, surprised observers by issuing its
regular Monday order list without granting a single new case. Greenhouse, Case of the
Shrinking Docket: Jutices Spurn New Appeals, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1989, § A, at 1, col. 1.
Although the number of cases offered to the Court had risen slightly over the prior
year's figure, the caseload is no longer showing the rapid increase of the late 1970s. Id.
§ B, at 6, col. 5.
294. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & M. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 43-45 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART
& WECHSLER] describing proposals for a new National Court of Appeals with final au-
thority to screen all certiorari petitions and deny any of them, and an Intercircuit Tribu-
nal consisting of two judges from each circuit to hear cases referred to the Tribunal by
vote of five Supreme Court justices.
295. See supra note 283, describing elimination of the Supreme Court's mandatory ap-
peals jurisdiction.
296. See supra note 38 (discussing the Supreme Court's use of this phrase in James v.
Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 349 (1984)). See also Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253
U.S. 17 (1920), where a state's highest court had denied relief to Indians claiming fed-
eral immunity from taxation, finding that the tax had been paid voluntarily. The United
States Supreme Court held that there was no fair or substantial support for this "plainly
untenable" finding. Id. at 22-23.
297. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ev rel. Patterson, 360 U.S. 240, 245 (1959) (per
curiam) (granting certiorari and reversing a state judgment inconsistent with Supreme
Court's previous mandate). See also the repeated visits of Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), described supra notes 21-28.
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ponentially growing docket. 298 District courts could increase dispo-
sition rates by cutting down the reflection time allotted to section
1983 cases and then dismissing them. Such a time-oriented ration-
ale was not explored in Pennzoil, but is well served by the Supreme
Court's presumption that no equitable relief should issue against a
pending state action unless state law "plainly bars" the section 1983
claim. Overcoming the presumption apparently requires that plain-
tiff meet a burden somewhat resembling the high civil standard of
"clear and convincing" evidence. 2 " Ambiguous statutes provide no
basis for preventing dismissal under this standard, and even a lower
state court interpretation that precludes reception of the federal is-
sues could be deemed insufficient to sustain plaintiff's burden.300
In the procedural due process area, Parratt's effort to hold back
the "font of tort law" 30' implicates time concerns as well as a more
developed federalism rationale. The Supreme Court has failed to
provide guidance on what constitutes adequate redress for unau-
thorized deprivations of liberty and property by state officials. This
failure could shorten the district court life of such due process cases
in several ways. Some judges have concluded that paper relief 302 or
298. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 294, at 50-52 (summarizing statistics on
civil filings). Comparing 1970 and 1986 figures, civil rights actions (particularly those in
the employment discrimination and prisoner petition categories) rose substantially.
Congress has recently taken measures to shrink the civil caseload by removing di-
versity jurisdiction in cases where less than $50,000.00 is at stake. Judicial Improve-
ments and Access to justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 201-03, 102 Stat. 4642, 4646
(1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332). Congressional efforts to reduce diversity jurisdic-
tion further are continuing. Labaton, Business and the Law, Panel Urges End of Diversity
Rule, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1990, § D, at 2, col. 1. In addition, a recommendation that
would virtually abolish diversity has been developed by a group of judges, legislators
and legal scholars appointed by Chief justice Rehnquist to a panel established by Con-
gress. Diversity would be retained only in rare multiparty disputes, such as airline catas-
trophe cases and in suits involving foreigners. Id., Mar. 23, 1990, § B, at 5, col. 3.
Because diversity cases involve no federal questions and can be heard in state tribunals,
their elimination from the federal docket is a far more appropriate time-saving device
than deportation of federal claims that would probably not be considered in any forum.
299. The plaintiff's burden of proving that state law plainly bars the § 1983 claim
should be no higher than preponderance of the evidence, and the burden shculd shift to
the state if there is apparently no mechanism for litigating the federal claims. See infra
note 379. See generally Underwood, supra note 111, at 1301 (discussing the implications
of the "clear and convincing" standard).
300. See supra discussion of Pennzoil at notes 89-101 and accompanying text. See also
notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
301. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (adopting the phrase from Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
302. See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text (discussion of Rittenhouse v.
DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451, 1459 (1 1th Cir. 1985), approving as adequate a "rem-




remedies arbitrarily withheld for years"03 are adequate. Others have
created no-win rules for litigants. °4
Why not characterize these consequences as justifiable effi-
ciency rather than expedience? This characterization would proba-
bly require a more forthright articulation of a cost-benefit rationale
than the Supreme Court has so far offered. More importantly, it is
"the exclusive province of the Congress not only to formulate legis-
lative policies.., but also to establish their relative priority for the
Nation. Once Congress... has decided the order of priorities in a
given area, it is... for the courts to enforce them when enforcement
is sought." ' 5
The objectives advanced by section 1983 slice through the Anti-
Injunction Law,306 establish the federal courts as buffers between
states and citizenry, and generally preclude jurisdictional prerequi-
sites such as exhaustion of state administrative remedies.30 7 The
Supreme Court Justices have propounded this congressional plan
and yet undermined it by introducing their own jurisdictional
303. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 264-66 and accompanying text.
305. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978) (affirming issuance of an injunction
against completion of a dam that would threaten the survival of species protected under
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976), and holding that
contrary action would infringe on the congressional power to establish law).
306. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
307. See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). Plaintiff's § 1983 suit
charged her employer, a state university, with discrimination on the basis of race and
sex. The court of appeals' en banc decision did not approve dismissal of the action, but
indicated that it would have done so if the state administrative process had been fair,
speedy, and had offered interim relief as well as effective redress for the claim where
warranted. Id. at 499. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that an exhaustion require-
ment would run counter to the thrust of the 1871 congressional debate on § 1983's
predecessor provision. Id. at 507, 516. Congress had assigned the federal judiciary a
paramount role in preserving constitutional rights, and had empowered plaintiffs to
choose a federal rather than a state forum. Id. at 503-06.
See also the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1982),
which applies to adult prisoners who file § 1983 actions. Under rigidly specified condi-
tions, federal courts are authorized to delay further action for a maximum of 90 days
while such plaintiffs exhaust prison grievance procedures that have been certified under
standards established by the Attorney General of the United States. Id. § 1997e(2).
Very few states' procedures have been certified, and one commentator has concluded
that states are not interested in pursuing certification, among other reasons because the
90-day delay provides too little incentive. Lay, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures for State
Prisoners Under Section 1997e of the Civil Rights Act, 71 IowA L. REV. 935, 949-51 (1986).
The Patsy opinion cited the elaborate provisions of § 1997e, which were passed in 1980,
to demonstrate that Congress continues to assume that exhaustion of administrative
remedies requirements are generally inappropriate in § 1983 cases. 457 U.S. at 511.





Laboring to reconcile dismissal of section 1983 actions with the
federal judiciary's role as "guardian" of civil rights,", the Court
substitutes state judges as suitable surrogates. Younger v. Harris
finds that federal intervention is unnecessary when a single state
proceeding "would be adequate to protect the rights asserted." '1
Hudson v. Palmer concludes that a state employee's intentional and
unauthorized destruction of property does not violate the due pro-
cess clause "provided, of course, that adequate state post-depriva-
tion remedies are available." 3 "1
This key fact about state processes cannot be determined unless
the district court's predismissal scrutiny is itself adequate. The diffi-
cult reconciliation of congressional and judicial wills that marks sec-
tion 1983 jurisprudence depends upon the legitimacy of the
substitute guardianship.
B. Equity
Although section 1983 refers to a "suit in equity" as permissi-
ble redress, the Supreme Court's exercise of rulemaking power
under the Enabling Act of 193412 established the union of law and
equity in one form of suit known as a civil action.313 Just as courts of
equity had evolved to fill gaps in the effective reach of law courts,
3 1 4
so equitable remedies operate as an Aristotelian "correction of legal
justice."'315
308. See generally Fiss, supra note 4; see also Monaghan, supra note 205, at 982. Profes-
sor Redish raises the crucial question of whether the federal judiciary has the authority
to set aside the directives of § 1983 and the jurisdictional correlative of 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(1982), and concludes that such judicial action violates separation of powers principles.
Where Congress decides to make federal jurisdiction turn on the efficacy of state re-
dress, it does so by an express provision such as the Civil Rights Removal Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1443 (1982). Redish, supra note 4, at I11.
309. See Patsy, 457 U.S. at 503 (quoting with approval from Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 252 (1972), discussed supra note 59).
310. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
311. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
312. 28 U.S. § 2072 (1988).
313. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2, enacted pursuant to the Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No.
100-702, tit. IV, § 401(1), 102 Stat. 4648. Section 1983's wording emanates from its
predecessor, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Star. 13.
314. F.W. MAITLAND, EQurry-A COURSE OF LECTURES 1-9 (1936); see also C. REMBAR,
THE LAW OF THE LAND 272-75, 280-81 (1980); C.D. BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE
359 (1957).
315. See ARISTOTLE, BK. V, CH. 10, *11376 NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1019-20 (1941).
When the law speaks universally.., and a case arises on it which is not covered
by the universal statement, then it is right ... to correct the omission-to say
what the legislator himself would have said had he been present, and would
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In two of the areas we have considered, equity's remedial signif-
icance is somewhat limited. First, Supreme Court review of ade-
quate-state-grounds determinations involves equitable principles
only in the jurisprudential rather than the procedural sense. Appel-
late jurisdiction includes the power "to make such disposition of the
case as justice requires. '"316 Procedural rules should not be en-
forced with such severity that they mandate "resort to an arid ritual
of meaningless form.""1 7 Fairness concerns are implemented with-
out being crystallized in specific remedies.
Second, equity has not played a prominent role in the constitu-
tional tort context. Commentators have suggested that such cases
could often be appropriately resolved by issuance of an injunction
or a declaration requiring the provision of adequate process.3 18
However, many plaintiffs have requested money damages,""9 and
courts have regarded damages as the usual form of relief for injuries
have put into his law if he had known. Hence, the equitable is just, and better
than one kind of justice-not better than absolute justice but better than the
error that arises from the absoluteness of the statement.
Id.
316. Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600,607 (1935). Defendant in Patterson had been
convicted of rape and the death sentence had been imposed after a third trial. His con-
tention that black citizens had been systematically excluded from both the grand and
petit juries was not considered by the Supreme Court of Alabama because counsel had
misunderstood state procedure and filed a motion for a new trial too late. The United
States Supreme Court held that this procedural determination was in accord with prior
state cases. However, a companion case involving the same proof but no procedural
barrier, Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 596 (1935), found that racial discrimination
was established. The Patterson court therefore held that "in determining what justice
does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which
has supervened since the judgment was entered." Id. at 607. Patterson was remanded to
give the state court an opportunity to review its prior determination in light of the Norris
findings. Alabama granted a new trial and sustained the conviction. Patterson v. State,
234 Ala. 342, 175 So. 371, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 733 (1937).
317. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 320 (1958). See also NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1964); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 291 (1963).
In all of these decisions, rejection of a state's adequate-state-grounds claim was based in
part on inconsistency with prior state precedents.
318. See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 228, at 267-68. The state officials responsible for a
constitutional tort are not usually in a position to create postdeprivation process, and it
may be unfair to hold individual officials liable for an injury resulting from the system as
a whole. Where a category of deprivation is high-risk and foreseeable, due process
might demand that measures be instituted to minimize that risk. Id.
Professor Whitman also concludes that damage actions should only be used where
punishment is appropriate. Compensation can be handled administratively, while deter-
rence and clarification of plaintiffs' rights are best accomplished through equity. Equity
can supply specific direction to deter future wrongs. Id. at 242, 262.
319. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 530 (1981). But see, e.g., Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). Plaintiff unsuccessfully sought damages and equitable redress
because his photograph had been included in a police department flyer identifying ac-
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akin to torts3 20 and discussed state redress from this vantage
point.3 21
By contrast, equitable remedies have been a focal point in sec-
tion 1983 cases requesting intervention in pending state proceed-
ings. Judicial refusal to grant injunctions or declarations in such
cases has been directly tied to the adequacy of state remedies "at
law" which render equitable assistance unnecessary.
Younger did more than incorporate the prior doctrine that a
plaintiff invoking equity must show that he has no legal recourse and
is threatened with irreparable injury.-22 The majority also con-
cluded that state and federal remedies are equally relevant to the
assessment of plaintiff's alternatives.3 23
This approach purports to follow traditional principles that dis-
favored injunctions against good faith criminal prosecutions.3 24
Yet, as Professor Redish highlights, this restriction was an out-
growth of a unitary English court system which had no state parallel,
and would therefore be applicable only to federal proceedings.3
25
The drafters of section 1983's statutory precursor probably did not
envision that the "suit in equity" they authorized would be ineffec-
tive against a state prosecution, particularly in light of their ex-
pressed doubts about the state judiciary's willingness to enforce the
Constitution. 26
The irony of invoking equity to prop up Younger's jurisdictional
restrictions becomes apparent when these restrictions are coupled
with the Supreme Court's treatment of ambiguous state law. The
issue of whether an alternate forum is in fact available has been
tive shoplifters. The Supreme Court denied relief on the grounds that the Constitution
does not protect this injury to reputation.
320. See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 180, at 41.
321. See, e.g., Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543; Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534-35 (1984).
322. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44, 46 (1971); see supra note 57 and accompa-
nying text (discussing other ways in which Younger restricted access to the federal gates).
"Great and immediate" was added to the irreparable injury requirement. Younger, 401
U.S. at 46. Extraordinary circumstances, such as prosecutorial harassment with no pros-
pect of local judicial vindication, must also be shown. Id. at 48.
323. Id. at 52-54.
324. See Bator, supra note 4, at 622 n.49.
325. See Redish, supra note 4, at 85-86.
326. Id. The Supreme Court has ruled that § 1983 is an exception to the Anti-Injunc-
tion Law, because its purposes would be frustrated if the pendency of a state proceeding
automatically precluded federal court action. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
The Younger opinion acknowledged that the equitable restraint doctrine emanated
from inapposite historical antecedents. It justified its adaptation of this doctrine in part
by reference to the advantages of avoiding duplicative proceedings-a concern that im-
plicates efficiency as much as equity. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45.
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reduced to virtual invisibility. Pennzoil reaffirmed that the federal
judiciary need not concern itself with the state remedy "at law" un-
less consideration of the section 1983 claim would be "plainly
barred."327
Genuine equitable concerns, such as preventing the jury's role
from being eroded, 228 would not be jeopardized by substituting
conscientious scrutiny for Pennzoil indifference. For example, the
Second Circuit's action in lowering Texaco's bond left the Pennzoil
jury's function intact. Equitable relief at the state trial stage (assum-
ing all other jurisdictional requirements were met)3 2 9 would gener-
ally not remove issues from jury consideration. Rather, the district
court would address only those federal claims that apparently would
be precluded in the local proceeding. If a federal declaration or in-
junction would have an unwarranted effect on that proceeding, ju-
risdiction could be retained without granting relief until after the
jury's verdict.35 0 And if the state trial were itself unlawful, the jury
would have no legitimate function to fulfill. 33 1
Equity can be viewed in its jurisprudential role of enhancing
fundamental fairness, or in its procedural role of filling gaps in the
law. Neither aspect supports the "plainly bars" rubric. If a federal
plaintiff proffers a substantial and pressing claim, equity necessarily
presumes a thorough examination of the state remedy before a
Younger dismissal.
C. Avoiding Disruption, Fostering Federalism, and Comity
Comity-related jurisprudence has provided elaborate justifica-
tions for restricting federal jurisdiction over the types of section
1983 cases discussed in this Article. The Supreme Court has, in
most instances, solicitously protected state autonomy and the har-
monious co-existence of dual judicial systems.3 32 This protection
327. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1987).
328. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45.
329. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
330. See supra subpart II(C) (discussing the Supreme Court's reasoning in Deakins v.
Monaghan).
331. See, e.g., Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 310-11 (1964) (holding that
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988), prohibits prosecution of persons
peacefully seeking service in a place of public accommodation). Such persons would not
only be immune from conviction, but would have a statutory right not to be brought to
trial on trespass charges. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 793-94 (1966).
332. See, e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 44; Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970) (because of the importance of maintaining
separate judicial systems, federal courts may not stay pending state proceedings unless
an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act applies).
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could be viewed as benefitting only the states and necessitated by
constitutional directives, 33 or as also benefitting the national gov-
ernment regardless of such directives.3 3 4
1. Comity and Adequate State Grounds.-Federal district court ac-
tion may be constrained by comity towards a parallel state system.
While the high Court tops the judicial pyramid, a special brand of
deference filters down to state tribunals. The Supreme Court has
interpreted its own jurisdictional boundaries so as to preclude set-
tlement of state issues.33s
Nonetheless, where a litigant presents a federal claim that a
state refuses to consider because of a procedural barrier, the Court
examines the procedure to insure that there is an adequate
nonfederal basis for the state's judgment. Hathorn succinctly set out
the central theme: "State courts may not avoid deciding federal is-
sues by invoking procedural rules that they do not apply evenhand-
edly to all similar claims."33 6
Such adequate-state-grounds cases vindicate federal rights, 3 7
333. As the Supreme Court noted in Atlantic Coast Line: "When this Nation was estab-
lished by the Constitution, each State surrendered only a part of its sovereign power to
the national government .... One of the reserved powers was the maintenance of state
judicial systems for the decision of legal controversies." 398 U.S. at 285.
334. See Younger's comment that "the National Government will fare best if the states
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions... " 401 U.S. at
44. Professor Althouse suggests:
There are distinct advantages to having a parallel system of courts working
alongside the federal courts and furthering the interests expressed in federal
law. State courts are in a better position to control violations of federal rights
presented in their own proceedings, as long as they do not perpetuate viola-
tions. Moreover, they may, at least in some states and during some periods of
history, surpass the federal courts in protecting individual rights, both by vigor-
ously enforcing federal law and by developing state law alternatives.
Althouse, The Misguided Search for State Interest in Abstention Cases: Observations on the Occa-
sion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1051, 1086 (1988). But see Beermann, supra
note 292, at 80 (concluding that the Supreme Court's federalism rationale has not been
predicated on allocating functions to the entity that can most ably perform them).
335. See supra subpart I(A). Some commentators have suggested that such deference
is not constitutionally mandated. See, e.g., Matasar & Bruch, supra note 17, at 1322-25.
Others have concluded that deference is most appropriate when states "overprotect"
federal rights-that is, exceed constitutionally required standards applicable to the fed-
eral claim. See Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1493-94 (1987).
336. 457 U.S. 255, 263 (1982).
337. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), for example, considered forty years of
relevant Alabama opinions and then unanimously held: "Novelty in procedural require-
ments cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those who, in
justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal
constitutional rights." Id. at 457. While here detrimental reliance was emphasized,
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and, as a possible corollary, help insure uniformity of federal rights.
The latter purpose is less clear, because typically, the prior prece-
dents used in determining the thrust of state law involve only state
law claims."38 At the very least, however, close reading of relevant
precedents gives an opportunity for Supreme Court review to any
litigants in the state whose federal claims 3 9 would otherwise be
barred by an irregularly applied rule.
The Hathorn principle has been maintained despite its potential
for disruption of state policy and insult to local officials."O On the
one hand, inconsistent application of law may indicate that the state
has no crucial interest in maintaining the offending procedural bar-
rier. If it does have such an interest, it may establish a well-defined
rule for future litigation. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's
review and rejection of the proffered state ground compels the state
judiciary to hear the litigant's claim on the merits and to ignore the
challenged procedural requirement in all comparable cases accruing
before announcement of a firm future policy. This new policy may
still be set aside if it is deemed to preclude a fair opportunity to
present federal questions.3 41
Insult to the state is inherent in the adequacy scrutiny. Reversal
of an erroneous state decision on the merits is a normal incident of
the appellate process, but the Hathorn context involves more than
this. There, the Supreme Court's message to the highest state tribu-
nal is in essence: "You should have honored your responsibility
under the supremacy clause3 42 instead of submerging federal rights.
You mischaracterize the basis for your decision and misread the im-
port of your own past opinions on state law questions."
2. Comity and Pending State Proceedings.-The careful adequacy
inquiry required by Hathorn is the antithesis of the casual disregard
affirmed in Pennzoil for cases where a section 1983 litigant requests
other decisions have cited a due process obligation to exercise discretionary power to
entertain a federal claim. See supra discussion in subpart I(A).
338. See, e.g., Quinn v. Branning, 404 So. 2d 1018 (Miss. 1981) (portion of a criminal
statute violated the state constitution's prohibition against local legislation).
339. Close scrutiny may be more appropriate for cases involving federally created
rights rather than state generated rights protected by the Constitution (e.g., contracts
clause controversies). See Sandalow, supra note 18, at 222-23.
340. See supra notes 21-28, 35-38.
341. See, e.g., Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama,
338 U.S. 294 (1949); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923); National Mut. Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Brahan, 193 U.S. 635 (1904).
342. U.S. CONST. art VI binds state judges to uphold the Constitution and federal law,
even in the face of contrary state enactments.
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district court intervention in pending state proceedings.3 43 One
might suppose that the divergence between the two approaches
could be explained by a greater potential for disruption and disre-
spect for state institutions in the Pennzoil context. This supposition
becomes less plausible on further analysis.
First note what is not in dispute. A pending state action can be
interrupted if it provides no mechanism for litigating federal ques-
tions raised by a section 1983 plaintiff.344 The remaining issue,
then, is whether the risk of interference would increase significantly
if district courts were to review state law conscientiously before dis-
missing a section 1983 case. The implication that federal judges are
expected to avoid that risk by performing their statutory duties with
a rubber stamp is disquieting.
More instances of inadequacy might well be found under a
heightened scrutiny level. However, the down-side risks to state au-
tonomy arising out of this scrutiny somewhat resemble the risks of
disruption present under the Hathorn standard. In both contexts,
the case at bar is directly affected, but the state has an opportunity
to change its procedures for future litigation. 45 If these changed
procedures violate federal law, they may still be invalidated.
For example, in Pennzoil the Second Circuit approved a lower
bond for Texaco, concluding that state law was so ambiguous that
the company could be deprived of any hearing on its challenge to
the constitutionality of the Texas bond and lien provisions.346 If the
United States Supreme Court had adopted this approach, the im-
pact would have been felt largely by Pennzoil, a private litigant
whose security for its judgment would have been substantially weak-
ened. The state's highest court could have exercised its discretion-
ary certiorari powers to insure a hearing on the constitutional
question during the course of Pennzoil's progress through the state's
judicial system. 47 For future cases, Texas could choose to clarify its
statutory or decisional law as to the availability of a vehicle for con-
343. See supra subpart II(B).
344. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
345. The issue in Hathorn was Mississippi's refusal to consider a claim under the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965), because it had not been raised until a
petition for rehearing was filed in the state's highest tribunal. See also supra note 44 and
accompanying text (further discussion of Hathorn). The effect of the United States
Supreme Court's decision was to compel the state to consider the federal claim on the
merits. Mississippi retained the power to promulgate a constitutionally sound alteration
in the rehearing procedure, which would be binding in new cases.
346. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
347. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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sideration of federal issues that relate to a private lawsuit but are
independent of the merits of such a suit. 4 '
Avoiding unnecessary disruption or delay of state judicial pro-
ceedings is a central Younger theme. 4 This purpose is not under-
mined by the modest requirement that dismissal of a section 1983
claim, without reference to its merits, be predicated on the existence
of a genuine state forum. It is the state, through its legislature and
judiciary, that determines whether or not it will receive the federal
plaintiff."' 0
If not disruption, what of disrespect? Although notions of com-
ity and federalism are often invoked as though they were identical
twins, it is instructive to consider them individually. Comity has an
aura of courteous recognition-of deference to another sover-
eign.3"' Federalism, on the other hand, speaks both to national
unity and state autonomy.
Younger does not reflect the nationalist suspicion of state institu-
tions that is implicit in other Supreme Court opinions3 52 and in sec-
tion 1983 itself. Nonetheless, the federalism enshrined by the
majority does not validate one-way deference. While Justice Black's
348. The United States Supreme Court considered the amorphous Texas Open
Courts provision to provide sufficient assurance that no litigant would be unfairly de-
prived of judicial access. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
350. Nor does this forum requirement alter substantive state provisions. Substantive
policy would be affected only indirectly, for example in a situation where the federal
district judge retained the case because the state's door was closed and at a further stage
in the litigation issued relief based on the merits. If state judges enforce federal law with
the same regularity as their district court counterparts, as Younger suggests, the chal-
lenged policy could fare the same in either court. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 4, at 91-92.
Protection of state substantive policy against federal interference apparently does
not have a high position in the Supreme Court's panoply in any event. Steffel v. Thomp-
son, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), concludes that comity and federalism have "little force" ab-
sent a pending state proceeding, even though a declaration of unconstitutionality under
such circumstances could have a great impact on substantive law. Id. at 462; see supra
note 72 (further discussion of Steffel). Professor Redish points out that equitable relief
under Steffel could affect prosecutorial and police discretion to the same extent as the
issuance of such relief in a pending proceeding. Redish, supra note 292, at 475.
351. See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 536
(2d ed. unabridged 1961) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S].
352. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), discussed supra note 59 and
accompanying text; Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141
(1988). Professor Fallon eloquently argues that the Supreme Court's federalism deci-
sions reveal a tension between two views. The Nationalist model, an outgrowth of post-
Civil War constitutional and legislative enactments, emphasized the primacy of federal
expertise and federal rights. By contrast, the Federalist model would limit federal judi-




opinion stressed leaving the states free to carry out their own func-
tions, it also recognized a union in which the national government
has "legitimate interests. 3 5 3 Among those interests is vindication
of federal rights s.3  The federalism rationale envisions intersecting
spheres. The overlap is hardly excessive when the federal judiciary
reviews a claim that the state would probably not adjudicate. Dis-
missal could compel the section 1983 plaintiff to expend time and
money in the state forum without being heard. 55
Nor is there a slur on a state's ability to determine constitu-
tional questions where that state apparently does not provide a vehi-
cle for such a determination. 5 6 Indeed, any insult to state judges is
far more trivial in the pending proceedings context than under
Hathorn, where the state court's finished product is minutely ex-
amined and then returned for overhaul.
3. Comity and Constitutional Torts.-The Hathorn standard is also
considerably more stringent than the approach taken in cases such
as Parratt. In each of the three areas considered in our comparison,
the adequacy of the state forum must be evaluated. The Parratt con-
text differs from the others to the extent that it is an outgrowth of
substantive constitutional doctrine. If state officers cause random
and unauthorized deprivation of property or liberty, their conduct
can be challenged in federal court. However, the constitutional
right that is implicated remains nascent 357 unless the section 1983
plaintiff is deprived of "the process [that] is due."3 s58
Nonetheless, this constitutional element seems to parallel the
"adequate remedy at law" discussed in nonintervention opinions.
Section 1983 governs both. Parratt's successor, Hudson v. Palmer,
used the terms "adequate," "meaningful," and "suitable" inter-
changeably to describe the required state remedy. 359
These decisions stressed comity and the risk of disruption in
353. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45. Cf. a pre-Younger dictionary definition of federalism:
"The federal principle of national organization or its support." WEBsmrR'S, supra note
351, at 928.
354. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45.
355. See, e.g., supra notes 118-28 and accompanying text.
356. Professor Redish concludes that the federal courts that decide § 1983 cases are
not themselves the root of offense to state courts in any event. Congress has given
§ 1983 plaintiffs a choice of forum; thus, it is the federal legislature and federal litigants
who are rejecting the state forum. See Redish, supra note 292, at 482-83.
357. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
358. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 357.
359. 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); see supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text for fur-
ther discussion of Hudson.
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developing generally pro-dismissal positions. If every alleged injury
inflicted by a state official were cognizable under section 1983, the
fourteenth amendment would become a conduit for tort law that
would merely replicate state systems. 3 ° Parratt constructed a verbal
diagram of the "complex interplay" between common law and statu-
tory provisions in forty-nine states, and a federal law that outranks
all states "to the extent of its authority" under the supremacy clause
of the Constitution. 36'
Such interdependence required the Court to decide whether
Nebraska's tort remedies satisfied procedural due process de-
mands.362 That goal, however, was circled rather than reached by
quotes from prior procedural precedent. No federal action is
needed where "[state] common-law safeguards... already exist." 3 63 This
reference glided over a general theme rather than providing a
methodology for determining the nature and certainty of such
safeguards.
The federal judiciary is understandably reluctant to supervise
state conduct involving trivial violations such as the negligent loss of
a prisoner's hobby kit. Yet lack of instruction from the Supreme
Court neither reduces the risk of disruption of state processes, nor
distinguishes between constitutional and common-law tort con-
cerns. District courts, given no guidance on what constitutes Hudson
adequacy, nor on how hard to look for such adequacy, have pro-
duced conflicting holdings. These holdings run the gamut from re-
quiring full common law damages where the harm cannot be
prevented,364 to assuming that a remedy "not yet refused" after
years of delay is satisfactory. 65
The inquiry into state processes to determine whether dismissal
is warranted should be a modified version of the one developed in
Hathorn. 66 A federal forum should be accorded where plaintiff
demonstrates that the section 1983 issues will probably not be heard
in state tribunals or will be considered only after inordinate delay.
Yet comity and federalism should shape the adequacy standard
360. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (quoting with approval from Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)). See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
361. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 531.
362. Id. at 537.
363. Id. at 542-43 (quoting from Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977) (em-
phasis in original)). See discussion supra note 250.
364. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
366. See examples discussed infra in Part V. See also supra note 273 and accompanying
text (discussing the use of dismissals without prejudice where state law is unclear).
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itself to a greater extent in the constitutional tort context than in the
other areas we have considered. This is because some Hudson cases
do not involve an amorphous remedy. Rather, state redress can be
obtained, although it is less generous than what is offered under
section 1983.367 If the deprivation of property or liberty alleged in
such a federal suit implicates largely the same concerns addressed
by the common law, the district court judge need not assume the
state's task of adjudicating tort questions."6 While the mere right
to file for an automatically unavailable state remedy would hardly be
"meaningful, ' '" 69 a relief gap should not in itself preclude dismissal.
Traditional forms of recovery, buttressed by state legislation that
governs new substantive areas or procedural questions, " can re-
solve recurring problems.3 7 '
By contrast, comity cannot be pivotal in a case encompassing
federal interests beyond those involved in tort law. In such suits,
adequacy should be roughly measured by the remedies Congress
has provided for violations of constitutional rights.37 2 The use here
367. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 244-50 and accompanying text (discussing whether the balancing
test developed for pre-deprivation hearings in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344-
45 (1976), is relevant to adequacy inquiries under Parratt). Commentators have criti-
cized the Mathews approach even in the context of pre-deprivation process, because
courts may simply assign heavy weight to whatever interest the state proffers and
thereby defeat the § 1983 claim. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 674 (2d
ed. 1988).
369. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533; see supra notes 188-98 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text.
371. See, e.g., Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions and Section 1983, 60 IND. L.J. 559, 581-
83 (1985). In wrongful death cases, almost all states have passed legislation authorizing
survivors to receive damage awards for loss of support. There is, however, considerable
state-to-state variation related to such issues as standing to sue and the availability of
punitive damages. Id. at 575-78. Professor Steinglass reviews the legislative history of
§ 1983, and the evidence that the 42nd Congress which passed the predecessor statute,
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, was particularly concerned with wrong-
ful slayings. Id. at 645-54. He proposed that § 1983 can itself be a wrongful death
remedy independent of state law if its remedial reference to the "party injured" were
construed to include survivors. Id. at 657-59.
372. The substantial-similarity approach proposed in Part III above does not contra-
vene the dicta, much less the holdings, in Parratt and Hudson. These opinions formu-
lated the gap question negatively; plaintiff need not receive from the state "all" that the
federal statute could accord. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 535 (1984). Such a formulation is consonant with the general
axiom that the Constitution guarantees a sufficient rather than an optimal process.
Although congressional rather than state legislation is the applicable guideline for
determining sufficiency, the state processes need not be identical to § 1983. The pro-
posed standard is flexible enough to permit distinctions related to the seriousness of the
alleged deprivation. For example, the absence of a punitive damages component in
state law would not preclude dismissal of a claim involving a state employee's malicious
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
of section 1983 remedial standards does not displace state provi-
sions, for these provisions were not designed to deal with federal
concerns. Section 1983 joins legislation such as the Anti-Injunction
Law and the civil rights removal provisions 373 as a manifestation of
congressional intent to regulate the federal-state balance of judicial
power.
Supreme Court decisions have used efficiency, equity, and fed-
eralism rationales to recalibrate this power distribution. These deci-
sions have neglected the subset of justifying adequacy tests that
relegate some litigants to nonexistent, delayed, or ineffective state
remedies. However, district judges who adopt a heightened scru-
tiny model can separate such litigants from the larger number
whose cases could be appropriately channeled to the state forum.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION
The following examples illustrate the application of a height-
ened scrutiny standard to cases like Pennzoil and Parratt. In each ex-
ample, the district court decides whether plaintiff's claims would
probably3 74 be heard in a state forum.
Green, a dentist, is charged with violating the state Dental Prac-
tice Act. Her license could be suspended by the State Board of Den-
tistry for two years if she is found guilty of this charge, and a hearing
before the Board is commenced. She brings a section 1983 action in
the federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the
Act. While the Board appears to have no authority to consider con-
stitutional issues, state law provides an appeal as of right from any
suspension of a dental license. The appeal is heard by a court with
plenary power to issue a declaration that has the effect of a final
judgment as to the rights of any party to a justiciable controversy.
Here, the federal judge could dismiss the complaint under
Younger1 75 and simply include a sentence in the decision describing
theft of a mental patient's family mementos. Yet deterrence against further harassment
of an institutionalized person requires that the federal plaintiff be given full compensa-
tion. See supra note 241. See also G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 62 (1980) (pointing
out that deterrence of blameworthy civil conduct has been a historic purpose of tort
law).
373. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
374. The word "probable" may be defined as "[h]aving more evidence for than
against." WEBSTER'S, supra note 351, at 1971. This is the definition adopted in this
Article.
375. State regulation of dental practice to assure competence has been characterized
as "unmistakably a significant state interest." Allen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Dentistry,




the adequacy of the state remedy.
In a closer case, a family court judge has ordered that Gray, a
litigant in a state paternity suit, be committed to a mental hospital
for thirty days. Gray commences a section 1983 action alleging a
serious constitutional defect in the statute on which the commit-
ment order was based, and seeking an injunction against the com-
mitment. He contends that his challenge to the constitutionality of
the order is unlikely to be heard in the state courts because family
court judges have no authority to issue declarations striking down
statutes, and commitment orders are reviewed only if the appellate
courts exercise unusual discretionary powers. 376
A strict reading of Pennzoil would lead the district court to dis-
miss the complaint on the grounds that state law does not "plainly
bar" the federal claims. However, under the standard proposed in
this Article, plaintiff would be entitled to a federal forum if he could
demonstrate that these claims would probably not be considered by
state tribunals. Because the state has a discretionary procedure that
might lead to a hearing on the constitutional issue, Gray would have
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that this
procedure is too uncertain to be adequate. 77
An optimal model for determinations of adequacy would be the
one developed in Hathorn, with the court engaging in a definitive
search and intricate analysis of state law. However, in Hathorn the
state had already refused to act, while in the Pennzoil and Parratt con-
texts a prediction must generally be made about whether such a re-
fusal will occur in the future.3 7' This Article therefore adopts a
modified version of Hathorn that places the responsibility of di-
gesting state law and practice on the section 1983 plaintiff.3 79
376. At least one lower court has concluded that Younger does not apply to state civil
commitment provisions because such provisions are not related to criminal statutes and
therefore implicate no important state interests. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 413 F. Supp.
1318, 1319-20 (E.D. Wis. 1976). Decisions such as Pennzoil, extending Younger far be-
yond the quasi-criminal realm, have superseded the Lessard approach.
377. See supra note 299 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor noted that in the
Parratt context "the claimant must either avail himself of the remedies guaranteed by
state law or prove that the available remedies are inadequate." Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 539 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The references to "guaranteed" or
"available" remedies indicate that an apparent absence of a vehicle for litigating § 1983
claims would require the state to assume the burden of demonstrating adequacy.
Professor Vairo suggests that the proponent of abstention should always have the
burden of proof on this point, because presumption should favor plaintiff's choice of
forum. See Vairo, supra note 4, at 206-07.
378. See supra discussion in section IV(A)(l).
379. In some instances, a litigant with a meritorious claim may be unrepresented or
may have inadequate representation. An optimal standard such as Hathorn's would in-
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Gray would marshall the pertinent statute and decisions inter-
preting it, plus information on whether the higher state courts usu-
ally exercise discretionary power to hear expedited appeals from
thirty-day commitment orders. The district judge's review of this
material and the state's opposing argument could be expeditiously
carried out. If Gray's constitutional challenge would probably be
heard in the state forum, Younger would apply. Conversely, if the
state's discretionary rescue process is rarely utilized, the federal
court would have a statutory obligation to decide the section 1983
case on the merits.
In some cases, it may be difficult to reach a conclusion about
the efficacy of state redress. For example, how should district
judges deal with serious allegations of bias in the state trial courts?
If the bias does not arise from the nature of the tribunal itself, pre-
judgment by the federal court would be offensive. 8 0 Yet, occasion-
ally there seems to be more than a boilerplate accusation involved.
The state's appellate courts could repair any erroneous ruling be-
low, but there still might be a long delay before the appeal stage is
reached.
A broadly applicable solution, which has the advantage of
breathtaking simplicity, is a dismissal without prejudice. Suppose a
section 1983 case involving an allegation of state tribunal bias com-
mences in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York. If Younger applies and the state remedy appears to be
adequate on its face, the judge notes these facts in a brief order.
The case is cleared from the judge's docket, and the section 1983
plaintiff returns only in the event that state appellate review is inor-
dinately delayed. If the case is refiled, it is referred to the same
judge who entered the dismissal order.3 8 ' To insure the possibility
of return, dismissal should be conditioned upon the section 1983
defendant's waiver of statute-of-limitations objections. This is a de-
vice used in forum non conveniens cases382 and could be equally
sure that the court would research state law to compensate for this deficit. See, e.g., F.M.
COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 145-
146 (1980) (describing efforts to go beyond a party's brief so that all applicable cases
and provisions are taken into account).
380. Compare Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973) (state Board of Optometry
incompetent to adjudicate issues because of bias resulting from composition of its mem-
bership), with Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 127 (1975) (presumption that state
judges will be biased in future litigation is improper). See also supra notes 261-62.
381. Letter from Clifford P. Kirsch, District Court Executive, United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, to Professor Maria L. Marcus (Dec. 12,
1989) (regarding dismissals without prejudice) (copy on file at Maryland Law Review).
382. See, e.g., Vargas v. A.H. Bull S.S. Co., 44 NJ. Super. 536, 552, 131 A.2d 39, 48
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serviceable here.
Moving to an example in the Parfatt area, consider a variation
on the Davidson facts. A prison guard receives a credible warning
that a prisoner will be assaulted by another inmate. The warning is
ignored and the attack occurs outside the guard's presence. The
severely wounded prisoner brings a section 1983 suit against the
guard, who had violated prison procedures by his inaction. State
tort law includes immunity provisions that might apply to this type
of case but (unlike the governing New Jersey law in Davidson) these
provisions are unclear.
Here the district court could abstain under Railroad Commission
of Texas v. Pullman Co.,"'3 to permit the state to clarify its law. How-
ever, the court's order would preclude plaintiff's return if immunity
were inapplicable and the state's tort law provided relief substan-
tially similar to the redress available under section 1983.384 Note
also that any immunity available under federal law should be accept-
able under state law.
385
Another method of insuring implementation of the Civil Rights
Act's forum guarantees would be passage of further legislation.38 6
An amendment to section 1983 could provide that: "Enjoining a
state court proceeding is prohibited only where it is probable that
(1957); Wendel v. Hoffman, 259 A.D. 732, 18 N.Y.S.2d 96 (2d Dept. 1940). A few
courts have utilized dismissals without prejudice in the Parratt area. See supra note 273
and accompanying text.
383. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
384. See supra subpart III(B) (discussion of the substantial-similarity requirement pro-
posed in this Article).
Plaintiff would inform the state courts of his federal claims, but reserve the right to
return to federal court with these claims if state immunity provisions automatically block
recovery. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the res judicata dangers
that arise in Pullman/England cases where state courts dispose of the federal claims).
No statute of limitations problems would arise from the district court abstention,
which would have the effect of a stay. See Crane v. Fauver, 762 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir.
1985); Board of Educ. v. Bosworth, 713 F.2d 1316, 1322 (7th Cir. 1983).
385. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982), indicating that state
executive officers have qualified immunity against damage suits unless they should rea-
sonably have known that they were acting in violation of clearly established constitu-
tional rights. Such immunity would probably not help the defendant in our hypothetical
who intentionally permitted the inmate under his supervision to be attacked, because
prison personnel should be aware that they have a constitutional responsibility to pro-
vide some level of care to inmates. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. De-
pending on the degree of risk known to the defendant, the intentional conduct here
could infringe due process. See supra note 238 for further discussion of defining duties
of care in prison situations.
386. Satisfaction with the Supreme Court's Parratt and Pennzoil approaches cannot be
inferred from congressional silence. Cf. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct.
2363, 2371 n.1 (1989).
MARYLAND LAw REVIEW
such a proceeding offers a fair opportunity for presentation and res-
olution of the injured party's claims under this section." It could be
further provided that
This section requires both an opportunity to be heard and
a meaningful remedy where any person has been confined
in a state institution by compulsion and intentionally de-
prived of liberty or property interests by a state official
while so confined. A state remedy in such cases is mean-
ingful when it bears a substantial similarity to the redress
available under this section.
Such a statute, covering both Pennzoil and Parratt adequacy as-
sessments, would make the underlying presumptions in section
1983 more explicit. Nonetheless, a judicial solution is preferable.
Casual and inconsistent treatment of adequacy is a product of the
judiciary, not the legislature, and therefore the courts should pro-
vide the clarification. Congress is unlikely to act in this area, and
can justifiably presume that section 1983's mandate is plain.
There will be many cases like Green's, where a very brief exami-
nation of state remedies will be sufficient to establish adequacy. In
such cases, a "plainly bars" standard or no standard at all would
yield the same result-dismissal. Yet there will be instances where
redress is improbable, and summary dismissal without careful in-
quiry would ultimately leave the litigant with no forum for a merito-
rious claim. The risk of such a deviation from congressional
directives can be reduced by combining examination of state proce-
dures under a modified Hathorn approach with increased use of al-
ternatives to outright rejection.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has stated that district judges may not fun-
nel section 1983 cases into state tribunals unless the state offers an
"adequate" remedy. Yet the tests governing adequacy determina-
tions focus primarily on the state's prerogatives rather than on its
procedures. As a result of this focus, some federal claims deported
to a state court are held in limbo until irreparable damage occurs or
are not heard at all, while others are accorded only paper or nomi-
nal redress. The adequacy requirement is not a mere outgrowth of
judicial largess. Rather, it is a substitute for compliance with con-
gressional enactments that give civil rights plaintiffs a choice of fo-
rum. These enactments cannot be automatically outclassed by
invocation of comity.
An appropriate standard need not make the federal judiciary's
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task unmanageable, nor leave the section 1983 litigant without ef-
fective redress, nor undervalue remedies made available by the
states. This Article proposes that the wide-ranging exploration of
opinions and orders by higher state tribunals that the Supreme
Court has undertaken in adequate-state-grounds cases be modified
for use in Pennzoil and Parratt situations. Where state law is ambigu-
ous, heightened district court scrutiny is necessary. However, the
section 1983 claimant must digest state law and practice, and per-
suade the court that federal issues would probably not be consid-
ered in the state forum. States with precise and receptive provisions
will be recognized.
A somewhat different constellation of factors appears in consti-
tutional tort cases where a plaintiff seeks damages for a random and
unauthorized injury caused by state officials. Here, the federal
judge must not only decide whether state tribunals would consider
plaintiff's procedural due process claims, but also whether meaning-
ful compensation is available under state law. In many instances no
special federal interest distinct from common law concerns is pres-
ent, and the state has developed or accreted tort provisions in light
of local needs. Under these circumstances, common law remedies
would generally be appropriate if they can provide more than nomi-
nal recompense.
However, the Supreme Court has identified a distinct constitu-
tional concern where the litigant has been confined in a state institu-
tion and intentionally deprived of liberty or property interests by
state employees while so confined. In such instances, the "process
that is due"-the equivalent of adequacy-should require a state
damage remedy that bears a substantial similarity to the redress
available under section 1983. Dismissal of the federal suit could be
predicated only on surrogate state provisions resembling the con-
gressional measure.
Additional state and private interests must be balanced in hy-
brid situations where neither federal adjudication on the merits nor
unconditional dismissal would be appropriate. Posit a plaintiff who
requests damages and an injunction against enforcement of an al-
legedly unconstitutional state penal statute that would precipitate
immediate economic losses. The constitutional issues would be liti-
gated in the course of the state prosecution; however, the financial
losses might not be compensated even if the statute were ultimately
struck down. Under these circumstances, the federal district court
should follow the methodology used in Deakins v. Monaghan. Juris-
diction should be retained, to be exercised if interim relief needed
1991]
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to stave off irreparable injury is unavailable in the state proceeding
or if damages cannot ultimately be accorded in the state forum.
The question of which judicial system is more competent, or
more likely to uphold constitutional rights, is only tangentially rele-
vant to the thesis that the section 1983 litigant must be assured of
appropriate redress in some forum. A tangential connection exists
because the federal district court judge should not dismiss the liti-
gant's suit on the mere assumption that state courts will provide
such redress. Dismissal after realistic inquiry takes a holistic view of
the dual judicial systems: they are independent, yet they interact
constructively to insure fair and orderly dispute resolution.
